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I Did My Time: The Transformation of 
Indiana’s Expungement Law 
JOSEPH C. DUGAN* 
“Betrayed / I feel so enslaved / I really tried / I did my time / I did my time . . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In Parker v. Ellis, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that “[c]onviction of a felony 
imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to future 
sanctions . . . but which also seriously affects his reputation and economic 
opportunities.” 2  While criminal conviction inflicts a necessary disability on the 
offender, expungement law presents a fitting remedy for the ex-offender: 
expungement ensures that employers, licensing agencies, and communities view an 
individual in light of her character today rather than the mistakes she made in her 
distant past.3 
Until recently, Indiana’s criminal records scheme was unforgiving. Hoosiers 
convicted of even minor offenses had few opportunities to wipe the proverbial slate 
clean.4 But in 2011, the General Assembly commenced a legislative project that 
culminated in a comprehensive expungement statute, enacted in July 20135 and 
substantially amended in March 2014.6 Under this new criminal records regime, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D. candidate, 2015, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My gratitude to 
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 1. KORN, Did My Time, on TAKE A LOOK IN THE MIRROR (Epic/Immortal 2003). 
 2. 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted), overruled 
in part by Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). 
 3. “It is a legal principle that correctional law is forgiving. Forgiveness is part and parcel 
of rehabilitation, whether of criminals or anyone else who has erred, or who has, in fact, what 
all of us have—the defects of being human.” SOL RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 788 
(2d ed. 1973), quoted in Luz A. Carrion, Comment, Rethinking Expungement of Juvenile 
Records in Massachusetts: The Case of Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
331, 331 (2004). 
 4. Indiana’s former expungement scheme can be sharply contrasted with more generous 
schemes in other jurisdictions. Compare IND. CODE § 35-38-5-5 (2008) (providing that 
ex-convicts may petition the state police to limit access to their criminal histories if more than 
fifteen years have elapsed since they were last discharged from prison, probation, or parole), 
with D.C. CODE § 16-803(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (stipulating that courts will seal records 
of an “eligible” offense if eight years have elapsed since the completion of the sentence and 
the petitioner satisfies other criteria), and OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225 (2011) (specifying that 
courts must generally grant expungement for a lower-grade offense if the petitioner has 
completed her sentence and at least three years have passed since the date of her conviction). 
 5. Act of May 6, 2013, No. 159, 2013 Ind. Acts 1631 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of IND. CODE tit. 35 (Supp. 2013)). 
 6. Act of Mar. 26, 2014, No. 181, 2014 Ind. Acts 2291 (codified as amended in scattered 
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ex-offenders may qualify for expungement of most misdemeanors and some felonies. 
Upon signing the statute into law, Governor Mike Pence declared, “Indiana should 
be the worst place in America to commit a serious crime and the best place, once 
you’ve done your time, to get a second chance.”7 
Indiana’s new expungement law represents a laudable step toward augmenting 
the rights of reformed Hoosiers, and the 2014 amendments correct several 
deficiencies that inhered in the original statute. Nevertheless, the law remains a 
work in progress. Its procedures are convoluted. Its remedies are flimsy. It excludes 
certain classes of petitioners while setting an unreasonably high bar for others. Its 
“one-bite-at-the-apple” limitation and repayment prerequisites are unrealistic, 
particularly for low-income petitioners. 
This Note evaluates the transformation of Indiana’s expungement law. Part I 
addresses the socioeconomic impacts of a criminal record. Part II presents normative 
arguments both for and against expungement, concluding that the balance tips in 
favor of forgiveness. Parts III–IV discuss Indiana’s original expungement provisions, 
the 2013 statute, and the 2014 amendments. Part V explores the reaction to the new 
law. Finally, Part VI offers recommendations to improve the statute so that its 
second-chance promise is equitable, accessible, and robust. 
I. STIGMATIZATION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE REFORMED 
Sociologists have long decried the stigma associated with a criminal record.8 In a 
seminal 1963 exposition on stigma, Professor Erving Goffman described the Greek 
origins of the term: stigma referred to “signs designed to expose something unusual 
and bad about the moral status of the signifier . . . a blemished person, ritually 
polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places.”9 Goffman traced the elements 
of stigma through the interactions of three distinct groups: the own (persons who 
                                                                                                                 
 
sections of IND. CODE tit. 35 (Supp. 2014)).  
 7. Lesley Weidenbener, Pence Signs Off on Rewrite of Expungement Procedure, 
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, May 7, 2013, at 5A. 
 8. Victor Hugo eloquently captured this “rap-sheet stigma” in Les Misérables, where 
ex-convict Jean Valjean recounted the parade of horribles that met him upon his reentry into 
society: 
I was liberated four days ago, and started for Pontarlier . . . . I went to the inn, 
but was sent away in consequence of my yellow passport, which I had shown at 
the police office. . . . [N]o one would have any dealings with me. I went to the 
prison, but the jailer would not take me in. I got into a dog’s kennel, but the dog 
bit me and drove me off, as if it had been a man. 
VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES 72 (Lascelles Wraxall trans., Heritage Press 1938) (1862). 
The Indiana Supreme Court has also written about the deleterious effects of rap-sheet stigma: 
[W]hen an adult is convicted of a crime, the conviction is a stigma that follows 
him through life, creating many roadblocks to rehabilitation. In addition to the 
general stigma of being an “ex-con”, or a felon, the conviction subjects him to 
being found a habitual criminal if he later commits additional felonies, and 
affects his credibility as a witness in future trials. 
Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. 1987). 
 9. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 1 (Simon 
& Schuster Inc. 1986) (1963). 
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share the disfavored trait), the wise (persons sympathetic to the stigmatized group), 
and the normals (persons who reinforce the stigma).10 The wise might be of some 
comfort to the own, but these sympathizers themselves hover on the margins of 
society: far more common are the normals, who perceive that stigmatized persons 
are “not quite human” and who “exercise varieties of discrimination” to “effectively, 
if often unthinkingly, reduce [their] life chances.”11 
Goffman’s theory applies with particular force to convicted criminals and 
ex-offenders. In a 2004 article, Professors Meares, Katyal, and Kahan wrote that 
interactions with the law-abiding world are problematic for persons convicted of 
crimes: the risk is high that normals will “define a criminal only in terms of his stigma” 
and avoid associating with him for fear of being contaminated.12 This disassociation, 
characterized in this Note as “rap-sheet stigma,” prompts the ex-offender to offend 
once more: he may perceive that “other options are closed” to him.13 
A. Sentenced in Perpetuity? Economic Considerations 
Devah Pager, a sociologist from Northwestern University, explored the 
economics of rap-sheet stigma in a 2003 study.14 Pager found that “ex-offenders are 
only one-half to one-third as likely as nonoffenders to be considered by employers.”15 
In a separate study cited by The Economist, sixty-five percent of employers in major 
cities admitted that they would not knowingly hire an ex-convict.16 These numbers 
comport with an earlier survey of employers in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los 
Angeles, which found that only thirty-eight percent would likely accept an 
application from an ex-convict.17 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. Rachel A. Smith, Segmenting an Audience into the Own, the Wise, and Normals: A 
Latent Class Analysis of Stigma-Related Categories, 29 COMM. RES. REP. 257, 258 (2012). 
 11. GOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 28; see also Amy Myrick, Facing Your Criminal Record: 
Expungement and the Collateral Problem of Wrongfully Represented Self, 47 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 73, 77–78 (2013) (linking Goffman’s theory of stigma and “spoiled identity” to the 
criminal records context). 
 12. Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2004). 
 13. Id. As another author put it, the ex-offender may find that “the only way to live in society 
is as a deviant. He re-offends, and fulfills the very expectations placed upon him” by his 
community. Jennifer Leavitt, Comment, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public 
Interests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1282–83 (2002). 
 14. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003). 
 15. Id. at 960. 
 16. Prison and Beyond: A Stigma That Never Fades, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, at 25, 26. 
 17. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former 
Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in 
IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205, 209–10 (Mary 
Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce Western eds., 2004). The surveyed employers were far more 
willing to consider members of other stigmatized groups, including welfare recipients (92%) 
and high school dropouts with GEDs (96%). Id. at 210. Employer unease with criminal records 
may explain why in New York State, up to sixty percent of formerly incarcerated persons are 
still unemployed one year after their release. Aaron Smith, Out of Prison, Out of a Job, Out of 
Luck, CNNMONEY (Nov. 11, 2009, 6:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/11/news
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The statistics are telling, but it is the stories of struggling individuals that are 
particularly distressing. Pager described a letter she received from an unemployed 
father: while the man was earnestly seeking employment, a decade-old conviction 
was proving an impenetrable barrier.18 The man’s “heart broke each morning when 
his six-year-old daughter would leave for school and say to him, ‘Good luck in your 
job search, Daddy!’ knowing that he would have to face her later that day with 
nothing more to offer.”19 An Indiana resident observed that his criminal record is the 
only thing that employers seem to care about.20 “It’s very difficult for a felon. . . . 
You realize that you’ve made a mistake; you’ve served your time for it; you’ve paid 
the consequence. So it’s time to get back on track with your life.”21 Getting back on 
track is a daunting feat indeed when employers treat a rap sheet as a scarlet letter.22 
B. Juvenile Crime and Brutal Need 
Expungement remedies the deleterious effects of rap-sheet stigma. This remedy 
is meaningful for anyone with a criminal past, but it is especially critical for two 
vulnerable classes: former juvenile delinquents and brutally impoverished 
ex-offenders. 
1. The Young 
In a 1963 study on society’s “sense of justice,” psychiatrists Edmund Bergler and 
Joost Meerloo described juvenile delinquency as a “catch-all term applied to all types 
                                                                                                                 
 
/economy/convict_employment/. 
 18. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 154 (2007). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Vic Ryckaert, New Law Gives Former Offenders a Second Chance, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Aug. 29, 2013, at B1. 
 21. Id.  
 22. One might argue that the perpetual punishment of a public record, evidenced by the 
job-related struggles of the reformed, straddles the line of unconstitutionality. See IND. CONST. 
art. I, § 16 (“Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be 
proportioned to the nature of the offense.”); Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1996) (“A sentence, even under a valid statute, may be unconstitutional by reason of its 
length, if it is so severe and entirely out of proportion to the gravity of the offenses committed 
as ‘to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of a reasonable people.’” (quoting Cox 
v. State, 181 N.E. 469, 472 (Ind. 1932))); see also Erin Westbrook, Comment, Collateral 
Sanctions as Punitive Sentences and the Minnesota Judiciary’s Expungement Authority, 9 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 959, 959–60 (2012) (“When an individual commits a crime, a judge imposes a 
criminal sentence based upon the sentencing guidelines, which allow for consideration of a 
variety of factors, including criminal history and the nature of the offense. The sentencing 
guidelines provide safeguards to ensure that a sentence is justified and follows traditionally 
recognized theories and goals of punishment. Yet, once an offender has fulfilled her sentence, 
she faces reentry into society under the shadow of a criminal record that, among other restrictions, 
prevents her from securing adequate employment and housing. And whereas the offender’s 
judicially imposed sentence is subject to judicial discretion within the limits of sentencing 
guidelines, the collateral ‘sentence’ is not subject to the same safeguards.”). 
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of legally proscribed actions when the offender happens to be in his or her teens.”23 
Bergler and Meerloo observed that delinquent boys and girls are “filled with a feeling 
of savage indignation; life, they are convinced, has cheated them out of something.”24 
This indignation may be a product of the physiological effects of puberty, the sordid 
conditions of life in lower-class communities, or the failure of parents to meet their 
children’s psychological needs. 25  Whatever the cause, “something in [these 
children]—their unconscious—has stacked the cards to ensure their own disaster.”26 
Much more recently, psychiatrist Andrew Solomon portrayed the untenable plight 
of juvenile delinquents in Far from the Tree.27 While acknowledging that “some 
people seem to be born without a moral center,” Solomon argued that for most 
juveniles, “the criminal potential requires external stimulus to be activated; the 
intense, internally determined psychopath of the movies is unusual.”28 Yet, Solomon 
continued, most of criminal law is “organized around the notion that young criminals 
are intractably malign.” 29  Courts are complicit in this convention: they waive 
juvenile offenders into adult court with ever-increasing frequency, particularly those 
juveniles who present themselves poorly or appear to lack supportive families.30 
Especially troubling is the criminal law’s failure to acknowledge the 
psychological and physiological limitations that encumber children: 
Biological evidence now demonstrates that the adolescent brain is 
structurally different from the adult one . . . . In the prefrontal cortex of 
a fifteen-year-old, the areas responsible for self-control are undeveloped; 
many parts of the brain do not mature until about twenty-four. . . . 
[H]olding children to adult standards is biologically naïve.31 
No one would seriously argue, and this Note does not contend, that juveniles 
should be granted some kind of carte blanche: even young people can cause serious 
harm, and the criminal justice system can function to rehabilitate miscreants of all 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. EDMUND BERGLER & JOOST A. M. MEERLOO, JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE 44 (1963). 
 24. Id. at 45. 
 25. Id. at 46–49; see also Press Release, Univ. of Pittsburgh, Yelling Doesn’t Help, May 
Harm Adolescents, Pitt-Led Study Finds (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.news.pitt.edu
/news/yelling-doesn-t-help-may-harm-adolescents-pitt-led-study-finds (citing new research that 
indicates harsh verbal discipline, like physical punishment, may drive adolescents toward 
depressive symptoms and antisocial behaviors). 
 26. BERGLER & MEERLOO, supra note 23, at 64. 
 27. ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH FOR 
IDENTITY (2012). 
 28. Id. at 544. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 546. Solomon described additional factors that weigh against too harsh a 
response to juvenile crime. Three out of four incarcerated children have a mental health 
diagnosis; between fifty and eighty percent have learning disabilities. Id. at 549. And while 
Solomon acknowledged that the “post-Freudian notion that all flaws are based in family 
relations is out of favor,” he recounted several observations of children whose parents “seemed 
unacquainted with the usual rules of love.” Id. at 554. 
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ages.32 But children who fall into crime long before they have the cognitive maturity 
or life experience to understand the consequences of their actions—and who, as 
Bergler, Meerloo, and Solomon have suggested, offend within a framework of 
circumstances beyond their control—are especially deserving of expungement.33 If 
these kids “do their time,” and if they change their ways, the same society that is quick 
to lock them up should be equally swift to extend forgiveness and a second chance.34 
2. The Poor 
Expungement provides appropriate relief not only to former juvenile offenders 
but also to the severely impoverished, those persons with “brutal need”35 who resort 
to crime as a reaction or perhaps a temporal solution to their poverty. 
Detroit presents a useful case study. The Motor City (“Motown”), ranked by 
Forbes as the most dangerous city in America for five years running,36 is also the 
nation’s poorest large city.37 About forty-one percent of Detroiters, and a shocking 
sixty percent of children, live below the federal poverty line.38 With the city in 
bankruptcy and with many government programs in jeopardy due to statewide budget 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Cf. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (“Why is 
it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or a girl has committed a 
specific offense, to find out what he is . . . and then if it learns that he is treading the path that 
leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade 
but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen.”). 
 33. See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (reciting differences between 
juvenile and adult offenders and recognizing that juveniles have an understandable lack of 
maturity, a tendency to fall prey to negative influences, and transitory personality traits). 
 34. See RUBIN, supra note 3, at 788 (“Forgiveness is part and parcel of rehabilitation.”). 
Additional arguments cut in favor of generous expungement schemes for children adjudicated 
as delinquents. Justice Rehnquist wrote in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. that juvenile 
criminal records bring “undue embarrassment to the families of youthful offenders and may 
cause the juvenile to lose employment opportunities.” 443 U.S. 97, 108 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment). From a different angle, public records may “provide the hardcore 
delinquent the kind of attention he seeks, thereby encouraging him to commit further antisocial 
acts.” Id. Ultimately, criminal records may “defeat the beneficent and rehabilitative purposes” 
of juvenile justice: publicity may place “additional stress on [the juvenile] during a difficult 
period of adjustment in the community, and [may] interfere[] with his adjustment at various 
points when he was otherwise proceeding adequately.” Id. at 108 & n.1 (quoting David C. 
Howard, J. Thomas Grisso & Robert Neems, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203, 210 (1977)). 
 35. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). 
 36. Daniel Fisher, Detroit Again Tops List of Most Dangerous Cities, as Crime Rate Dips, 
FORBES (Oct. 22, 2013, 7:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/10/22
/detroit-again-tops-list-of-most-dangerous-cities-but-crime-rate-dips/. 
 37. Kevin D. Williamson, Detroit Goes Down: A Lesson for American Cities, NAT’L REV. 
(July 19, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/353862/detroit-goes-down
-kevin-d-williamson. 
 38. See Detroit, MI, CENSUS REPORTER, http://censusreporter.org/profiles
/16000US2622000-detroit-mi/; Irwin Redlener, Amid Bankruptcy, Detroit Has a Bigger 
Problem, USA TODAY (July 29, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion
/2013/07/29/detroit-bankruptcy-child-poverty-column/2597227/. 
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cuts and federal sequestration, aid resources are sparse: one social service agency 
reported that its 2013 budget for emergency shelters was reduced by over forty 
percent. 39  Scott Paul, President of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, 
observed that “[i]n Detroit, it’s come down to matters of basic survival: keeping the 
water turned on, providing basic public services, determining which blocks to raze 
and which to save.”40 
The link between poverty and crime, in Detroit and in penurious communities 
across America, is not difficult to fathom. Hunger gives rise to theft; the fires of arson 
rage as property owners seek to cash out insurance policies.41 Controlled substances 
present a tempting reprieve from bleak circumstances.42 Violence, too, escalates with 
poverty. Analysts Ching-Chi Hsieh and M.D. Pugh concluded in a 1993 study that 
“resource deprivation is an underlying cause of violent crime and that poverty and 
income inequality are both indicators of resource deprivation.”43 Economist Richard 
McAdams echoed these concerns, writing that “[a]n economic cost of inequality is 
greater street crime.”44 
Understanding the link between poverty and crime helps one understand the 
relationship between the two classes this Note has identified as particularly deserving 
of expungement: juvenile offenders and the brutally poor. Children born into poverty 
are susceptible to delinquency. As Professor Richard Delgado observed, “It is 
absurdly callous to assert that poverty, lack of opportunity, a poor education, and 
desperate circumstances play no role in predisposing people to lives of crime, 
especially if they are born into those circumstances and live in them all their lives.”45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Bill Laitner, As Poverty Spreads and Funding Is Cut, Charities Need Metro 
Detroiters’ Help, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article
/20131124/NEWS05/311240071/homeless-SNAP-Salvation-Army-Detroit. 
 40. Scott Paul, Is What I Saw in Detroit America’s Future?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 
2014, 3:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-paul/is-what-i-saw-in-detroit_b
_5621756.html?utm_hp_ref=detroit&ir=Detroit. Television personality and erstwhile chef 
Anthony Bourdain put the matter more colorfully: “The only place I’ve ever been that looks 
anything like Detroit does now is Chernobyl.” Anthony Bourdain Parts Unknown: Detroit 
(CNN cable transmission Nov. 10, 2013). 
 41. See, e.g., State v. Enright, 2000 MT 372, 303 Mont. 457, 16 P.3d 366; State v. 
Murdock, 500 P.2d 387 (Mont. 1972); Phillips v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 640 N.Y.S.2d 
24 (App. Div. 1996). In some jurisdictions, merely soliciting funds may constitute a crime. 
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-45-17-1 (2008) (criminalizing begging in circumstances such as after 
sunset or before sunrise, at a bus stop, near a restaurant, or with a partner); cf. Speet v. Schuette, 
726 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2013) (ruling that Michigan’s broad antibegging statute facially violated 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
 42. See Sandra Langley, The Homeless in Utah—Reflections from a New Bar Member, 
UTAH B.J., Dec. 1997, at 36, 37 (“Many believe that the degrading nature of poverty itself is 
to blame for so many turning to some form of chemical relief. Approximately 17% of the 
homeless are physically disabled. The average life expectancy for homeless people is 51. Given 
the foregoing, is it any wonder that findings show anywhere from 48% to 80% of the homeless 
are seriously depressed, three to five times the national average.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 43. Ching-Chi Hsieh & M.D. Pugh, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A 
Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies, 18 CRIM. JUST. REV. 182, 198 (1993). 
 44. Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 37. 
 45. Richard Delgado, The Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 1, 19 (2011). 
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Some jurists and criminologists have gone so far as to suggest that courts should 
recognize a kind of “poverty defense,” at least for certain economically motivated 
crimes.46 Such a defense, however academically intriguing, seems unlikely to gain 
much traction given the tough-on-crime realpolitik of contemporary society.47 Yet 
liberal expungement laws could provide a more modest and palatable mechanism for 
addressing the relationship between poverty and crime. Criminal records prevent 
members of impoverished communities from obtaining employment, but these 
records have other collateral consequences as well: they may lead to denial of 
housing, ineligibility for cash assistance, and disqualification for retirement 
benefits.48 Unemployed and unlikely to secure gainful work with the stigma of a rap 
sheet, ex-offenders are left with few alternatives—and “America’s poorest 
communities, especially those of color, bear the brunt of the pervasive cycle of arrest, 
incarceration, and reentry.”49 Expungement throws a wrench in the gears of that 
cycle, ensuring that an ex-offender, having satisfied the penalty imputed by law, can 
once again enjoy the rights and privileges afforded to all persons in a society of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. E.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that there may be a “significant causal relationship between violent 
criminal behavior and a ‘rotten social background’”); Delgado, supra note 45, at 14 (arguing 
that society’s failure to recognize a defense of “severe environmental deprivation” makes 
some impoverished defendants double victims). 
 47. But see State v. Marrs, 723 N.W.2d 499, 505 (Neb. 2006) (“When imposing a 
sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) 
education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or 
record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of 
the offense, and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.”). 
 48. Beth Johnson, Helping Clients with Criminal Records: It’s More Than Expungement, 
CBA REC., Oct. 2013, at 32, 33. In a 2003 report, the ABA acknowledged the insipid nature 
of these collateral consequences: “they often take effect without judicial consideration of their 
appropriateness in the particular case” and without any requirement that the parties even be 
aware of them. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS R-1 (3d ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2003/journal/101a.authch
eckdam.pdf; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 92 (2010) (“Once a person is labeled a felon, he or she is ushered 
into a parallel universe in which discrimination, stigma, and exclusion are perfectly legal, and 
privileges of citizenship such as voting and jury service are off-limits.”); National Inventory 
of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, ABA COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, 
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (identifying 1978 collateral consequences under 
federal and state law in Indiana). 
 49. Leavitt, supra note 13, at 1281; see also Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the 
Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1379 (2005) (“Without access to housing and employment, 
[ex-offenders] face a Hobson’s choice: they can be law-abiding, but homeless and penniless, 
or they can recidivate and have income.”). In a situation bordering on the absurd, a homeless 
ex-convict was reincarcerated in 2012 after he tossed a brick through the glass doors of a 
federal courthouse, concluding that a warm prison bed was preferable to another night on the 
streets. WTVM, Homeless Man Intentionally Commits Crime To Go Back to Prison, 
WSFA.COM (Apr. 25, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.wsfa.com/story/17695143/homeless
-man-intentionally-commits-crime-to-go-back-to-prison. 
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equals. As Professor Fruqan Mouzon observed, “Human fallibility makes 
forgiveness a cornerstone of civilized society.”50 
II. A NORMATIVE DEBATE 
The socioeconomic effects of rap-sheet stigma supply compelling justification for 
a robust expungement scheme. However, other arguments cut in different directions. 
Before evaluating Indiana’s law, it is helpful to review these underlying ethical 
considerations. This Part will begin by presenting several arguments in favor of 
indelible records and public access; it will then consider additional arguments in 
support of erasure and confidentiality. 
A. Expungement as Unmerited Reward 
Perhaps the strongest argument against what critics term “aggressive” 
expungement 51  is the need for communities to be informed about the hazards 
presented by their neighbors. In United States v. Flowers, the Seventh Circuit 
explained that “expungement is, in fact, an extraordinary remedy and . . . ‘unwarranted 
adverse consequences’ must be uniquely significant in order to outweigh the strong 
public interest in maintaining accurate and undoctored records.”52 
Obviously, access to such records may affect the choices that individuals make: 
where to move, whether to leave the kids unattended, which contractor to hire for a 
construction job. 53  But access transcends individual decision making: Professor 
James Diehm pointed out that in most jurisdictions, the licensing process for 
members of the legal, medical, pharmaceutical, and accounting professions includes 
a criminal background check to ensure that “the applicant is a person of integrity and 
deserving of the public trust.”54 Professor Diehm warned that “[s]erious problems 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement 
Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008); cf. 111 CONG. REC. 1427 (1965) (legislative 
prayer of Reverend Bernard Braskamp) (“O Thou God of all grace and goodness . . . . We 
penitently confess that our hearts are often cold and callous and we fail to have a keen sense 
of our social responsibility and a sincere interest in the welfare of needy humanity. Grant that 
in the great adventure of building a better world we may know how to coordinate practical 
commonsense with lofty idealism.”). 
 51. See, e.g., T. Markus Funk & Daniel D. Polsby, Distributional Consequences of 
Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records: The Problem of Lemons, 52 WASH. U.J. URB. 
& CONTEMP. L. 161 (1997). 
 52. 389 F.3d 737, 739 (2004). 
 53. But see Michael D. Mayfield, Comment, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing 
Information in the Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1065 (“[E]xpungement only 
increases the risk of danger to the public indirectly. The average citizen does not have access 
to criminal records. As a result, there is no increased risk to the average citizen when records 
are expunged. A typical citizen would not likely take additional precautions when dealing with 
an offender whose record is expunged because the citizen is usually not aware the criminal 
record ever existed.”). 
 54. James W. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 73, 76 (1992). 
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may arise if the applicant’s criminal record has been expunged.”55 Professor Diehm 
also expressed concern that expungement may impede law enforcement officers in 
their review of forensic evidence and serial offenses,56 although this concern may be 
mitigated in jurisdictions in which police investigators retain access to expunged 
records for official purposes.57 
Another, less obvious, concern with state expungement schemes is their tendency 
to conflict with federal laws and regulations. Writing in 2013 shortly after the 
passage of Indiana’s comprehensive expungement statute, attorneys for Bose 
McKinney & Evans LLP noted that its remedies provision conflicts with section 19 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which prohibits FDIC-insured institutions from 
employing persons convicted of certain trust-related offenses without first securing 
an FDIC waiver.58 Thus, a bank in Indiana is placed in the delicate position of 
complying with both state law—which prohibits it from discriminating on the basis 
of expunged records—and federal law—which compels it to inquire about the 
contents of such records and to take appropriate action.59 Expungement statutes may 
conflict with other federal laws as well, such as criminal laws with elements 
relating to prior convictions60 and laws governing the distribution of welfare benefits to 
former drug offenders.61 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 77. 
 57. E.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-9-6(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2014) (authorizing release of expunged 
records to law enforcement officers, defense and prosecuting attorneys, and DHS/FBI officials 
acting in the course of duty). 
 58. HEA 1482 Makes It Unlawful To Discriminate Based on Expunged Criminal Records, 
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS LLP (June 6, 2013), http://www.boselaw.com/2013/06/hea-1482
-makes-unlawful-discriminate-based-expunged-criminal-records/. The Bose attorneys noted 
that under FDIC policy, records that have been completely expunged—such that no one, 
including law enforcement, can access them—will not disqualify a candidate. Id. But most 
contemporary state expungement statutes, including Indiana’s, allow for some official access. 
 59. Conflict preemption doctrine provides a solution here: where federal law directly 
conflicts with state law, federal law must trump: “There can be no dispute that the Supremacy 
Clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with an Act of Congress.” Rose 
v. Ark. State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 3 (1986); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). Still, hiring 
managers and HR professionals at FDIC-insured institutions may lack expertise on the finer 
points of constitutional law, and state-federal conflicts burden these professionals. 
 60. See United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 1975) (Sneed, J., concurring in 
the result) (“[S]tate law must be examined to determine whether the defendant has been 
convicted of a felony. The relevant state law to be examined in this determination does not 
include expunction statutes. Such statutes do not rewrite history; they merely provide that 
previous history is immaterial for certain purposes under state law. It is not within the power 
of a state to make such history immaterial to the administration of the federal criminal law or 
the interpretation of federal criminal statutes. Only Congress can do that.” (emphasis added)). 
 61. Compare § 35-38-9-10(e) (Supp. 2014) (“A person whose record is expunged shall 
be treated as if the person had never been convicted of the offense.”), with DIV. OF FAMILY 
RES., IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
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Finally, some critics oppose expungement on moral or penological grounds. In a 
1970 article, practitioners Bernard Kogon and Donald Loughery, Jr., blasted what 
they saw as a casual and uncritical acceptance of expungement law, writing: 
In trying to conceal a record we seek to falsify history—to legislate an 
untruth. Such suppression of truth ill befits a democratic society. Good 
intentions are no defense. To enable an offender to deny that he has a 
criminal record when in fact he has one is to help him deny a part of his 
identity.62 
Almost three decades later, T. Markus Funk and Daniel Polsby argued that 
“labeling theorists,” who believe that the “perceptions of others control or influence 
one’s behavior,” overlook the “value of the symbolic significance that attaches to 
any form of punishment” and the “importance of making the person labeled aware 
that he has violated communal values, and that such violations carry with them 
certain negative consequences.”63 Commentators like Kogon and Loughery, Funk 
and Polsby seem to view a criminal record as a suitable penalty for a person who has 
broken the social compact: it may be his cross to bear, but it is a cross of his own 
construction. One is reminded of Jacob Marley, usurer of Dickensian lore,64 fettered 
with the chains he forged, link by link, through his avarice.65 
                                                                                                                 
 
(SNAP) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2012) (“There is a federal law that states anyone 
with a drug conviction after 8/22/1996 is ineligible to receive SNAP benefits indefinitely. It is 
possible for state legislatures to override this federal law. To date, Indiana has not.”); see also 
S. 286, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014) (bill that would have extended SNAP 
and TANF benefits to former drug offenders who secured expungement; dead in committee). 
 62. Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal 
Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 378, 385 (1970); see also 
Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and 
Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 749 (1981) (“The expungement model 
attempts to rewrite history: it denies reality. This deliberate deception of the public violates 
our longstanding and generally unquestioned preference for truth over falsity.”). 
 63. Funk & Polsby, supra note 51, at 169–71; see also T. Markus Funk, The Dangers of 
Hiding Criminal Pasts, 66 TENN. L. REV. 287, 289 (1998) (“[A]ggressive expungement 
operates to perversely penalize persons who have conformed their behavior to the dictates of 
the law, while providing unjustified gains to those who have not.”). Goffman’s theory offers 
one possible response to Professors Funk and Polsby: as long as the normals retain access to 
the ex-offender’s record, they will disassociate with him; he may fully appreciate the gravity 
of his past misconduct, fully rehabilitate, and yet still find himself ostracized as a common 
criminal. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 64. “‘I wear the chain I forged in life,’ replied the Ghost. ‘I made it link by link and yard 
by yard; I girded it on of my own free will, and of my own free will I wore it.’” CHARLES 
DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 18 (Bradbury & Evans 1858) (1843). 
 65. The moral/penological argument may carry more normative weight for those offenses 
fairly characterized as mala in se: few commentators would seriously argue that society should 
quickly forgive and forget such heinous acts as murder and rape. In fact, those more serious 
crimes are generally excluded from state expungement schemes, while other crimes—such as 
burglary and assault—are subject to stiff requirements and lengthy waiting periods. For mala 
prohibita offenses, the moral argument seems less compelling: it is difficult to envision Jacob 
Marley forging his links by failing to file a state tax return, drinking by the roadside, or 
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B. Expungement as Remedy 
Opponents of expungement—or those who favor stringent requirements and 
lengthy waiting periods—raise some persuasive arguments. The issue is 
complicated, and as a society we should be cautious and deliberate whenever we 
attempt to rewrite history. 66  On balance, however, this Note concludes that the 
benefits of expungement outweigh its putative costs. This Note has already addressed 
the principal argument in favor of a robust expungement scheme—that erasing the 
records of reformed ex-offenders can eliminate stigma and the austere economic 
consequences that accompany it.67 This Note has also argued that former juvenile 
delinquents and brutally poor ex-offenders are particularly deserving of a second 
chance.68 There are additional reasons, however, to view expungement not merely as 
a humanitarian gesture but as an essential complement to our contemporary criminal 
justice system. 
First, expungement is a necessary corollary to a system characterized by 
exuberant prosecution of mala prohibita and noncore offenses. In a 2004 symposium 
article, Professor Douglas Husak of Rutgers proposed that core crimes conform to 
one of three patterns of liability: manifest criminality, or inherently dangerous acts; 
subjective criminality, or acts intended to violate a protected interest; and harmful 
consequences. 69  Conversely, noncore crimes “are best understood to be those 
offenses that have not been justified as legitimate exercises of state power over free 
and autonomous individuals.”70 Husak expressed concern about the prosecution of 
overlapping crimes. 71  He likewise expressed concern about the proliferation of 
risk-prevention offenses, such as illicit drug possession.72 Husak’s primary criticism, 
however, pertained to the growth of ancillary offenses—crimes to which prosecutors 
turn when they lack sufficient evidence to obtain conviction for the conduct they 
actually seek to penalize.73 
Commentators have approached the problem of excessive criminalization from 
various angles, 74  but many concur that “[o]vercriminalization is a matter of 
                                                                                                                 
 
surreptitiously smoking a joint. 
 66. “In 41 states, people accused or convicted of crimes have the legal right to rewrite 
history.” Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/17expunge.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 67. See supra Part I.A. 
 68. See supra Part I.B. 
 69. Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 757 (2004) (citing 
GREGORY P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978)). 
 70. Id. at 779. 
 71. These are crimes that share common elements with other crimes but also contain 
distinct elements such that double jeopardy doctrine is not implicated. As a result, prosecutors 
can stack charges and courts can assign harsher penalties. Id. at 770–71. 
 72. Id. at 771. 
 73. Id. at 771–72 (discussing derivative crimes such as money laundering and 
information-gathering offenses such as violations of the Bank Secrecy Act). 
 74. See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Facilitating Crimes: An Inquiry into the Selective Invocation 
of Offenses Within the Continuum of Criminal Procedures, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 665 
(2011) (questioning the legitimacy of three categories of crimes that implicate only portions 
of the arrest-arraignment-conviction-punishment continuum: detention crimes, which exist 
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bi-partisan concern, a proper subject for legislative reform of criminal codes, and 
may, in part, explain the increasing numbers in our prisons.”75 Given the American 
embrace of comprehensive criminalization and our consequent status as home to the 
world’s largest prison population, 76  expungement—particularly for low-level or 
mala prohibita offenders—seems not only permissible but necessary. If rap-sheet 
stigma is real, and the statistics certainly suggest that it is,77 then we owe it to a 
substantial number of our fellow Americans to give them a second lease on life after 
they have “done their time” for acts which, perhaps, should not have been 
criminalized in the first place.78 
Second, expungement complements contemporary initiatives to combat 
recidivism. Cognizant of prison crowding and the cycle of incarceration and release, 
the federal government led the charge in these initiatives with the passage of the 
Second Chance Act of 2007.79 The Act created a buffer between prison and reentry, 
doubling inmates’ allowable community confinement from the last six months to the 
last twelve months of a sentence.80 It also required the Federal Bureau of Prisons to 
                                                                                                                 
 
principally to facilitate arrests and for which conviction is an afterthought; charging crimes, 
which prosecutors employ as instruments to negotiate plea agreements; and pleading crimes, 
which rarely provide the basis for an initial arrest but to which defendants plead guilty after 
successful bargaining). 
 75. State v. Copenhaver, 834 N.W.2d 870, at *7 (2013) (unpublished table decision) 
(Danilson, J., specially concurring); cf. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005) (“Countless petty offenses, civil infractions, and traffic 
ordinances are handled by law enforcement in the same fashion as serious offenses or are 
bootstrapped into quasi-crimes through legal fictions. Juveniles are not only liable for 
violations of the relevant penal code, but also for a variety of ‘status offenses’ involving 
behaviors that are perfectly legal for adults—staying out late, smoking or chewing tobacco, 
drinking alcohol, having sexual relations, failing to attend class, and so on.”); Michael L. 
Travers, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1995) (“The 
criminalization of ostensibly innocent behavior has created situations in which people may be 
convicted of serious crimes without having had any idea they were doing something illegal.”). 
 76. Int’l Ctr. for Prison Studies, Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Total, 
PRISONSTUDIES.ORG, http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total
?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All; cf. 15 Years in Environment of Constant Fear Somehow 
Fails To Rehabilitate Prisoner, ONION (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.theonion.com/articles/15
-years-in-environment-of-constant-fear-somehow-f,35434/ (satirizing America’s culture of 
incarceration) (“Reportedly left dumbfounded by the news that [a] recent parolee . . . had been 
reincarcerated on charges of assault and battery, officials . . . struggled Tuesday to make sense 
of how the prisoner had not been rehabilitated by 15 years of constant threats, physical abuse, 
and periodic isolation.”). 
 77. See supra Part I.A. 
 78. See, e.g., Kathleen Miles, Just How Much the War on Drugs Impacts Our Overcrowded 
Prisons, in One Chart, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/10/war-on-drugs-prisons-infographic_n_4914884.html 
(finding that 50.1% of federal inmates were convicted of drug offenses and 10.6% of 
immigration offenses, while only 2.8% were convicted of homicide/assault/kidnapping and a 
statistically irrelevant percentage were convicted of national security offenses). 
 79. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 80. John Spyros Albanes, Demystifying Risk Assessment: Giving Prisoners a Second 
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establish benchmarks for recidivism reduction, and—most notably—it provided 
grants for state rehabilitative programs.81 As Representative Danny K. Davis noted 
in a March 2013 letter to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, 
and Related Agencies, state-level investment in reentry programs has resulted in 
double-digit recidivism declines in recent years.82 Reentry programs often involve 
significant government expenditures—funding for housing, workforce development, 
and substance abuse treatment programs.83 But the ultimate success or failure of 
these programs will turn on how effectively they equip ex-offenders to achieve 
normalcy in their communities. Federal funding alone will not offset rap-sheet 
stigma, but expungement can. When viewed as part of the national effort to combat 
recidivism, a robust expungement scheme makes sense.84 
Finally, expungement serves as a kind of meager reparation for low-income 
defendants marginalized by an overworked and underregulated criminal justice 
system. This point bears emphasizing: expungement is payback for defendants 
abused by a broken system in which due process is too often an ideal rather than a 
constitutional guarantee. The case of Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon illustrates the 
problem.85 In Wilbur, a class of indigent criminal defendants brought an action to 
challenge the adequacy of the public defense systems in Mount Vernon and 
Burlington, Washington. The court found that indigent defendants in these cities were 
“systematically deprived of the assistance of counsel at critical stages of the 
prosecution and that municipal policymakers have made deliberate choices regarding 
the funding, contracting, and monitoring of the public defense system that directly and 
predictably caused the deprivation.”86 The cities’ public defense contract, according to 
which a private firm was paid $17,500 per month for a caseload of approximately 1700 
cases (or just over $10 per case) rendered it “virtually impossible that the lawyer, no 
matter how competent or diligent, will be able to provide effective assistance.”87 
The situation in Mount Vernon and Burlington was not anomalous: Professor 
Michelle Alexander noted that while roughly eighty percent of criminal defendants 
are indigent, the “quality of court-appointed counsel is poor because the miserable 
working conditions and low pay discourage good attorneys from participating in the 
system.”88 Carrie Johnson of National Public Radio recited calls for a bipartisan 
White House commission to evaluate impediments to justice and fairness for 
                                                                                                                 
 
Chance at Individualized Community Confinement Under the Second Chance Act, 64 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 937, 945 (2012). 
 81. Id. at 946. 
 82. Letter from Danny K. Davis, Member of Cong. (Mar. 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.csh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FY14SCAAppropriationsLetter.pdf. 
 83. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces 
More Than $62 Million To Strengthen Reentry, Probation and Parole Programs (Nov. 13, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-ag-1217.html. 
 84. See BRIAN FASK, CHICAGO COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, EXPUNGEMENT: A BEGINNING 
TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM (2004). 
 85. 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
 86. Id. at 1124. 
 87. Id. at 1132. 
 88. ALEXANDER, supra note 48, at 84. 
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low-income defendants. 89  One hopes that increasing awareness of the plight of 
indigent defendants may begin to level the playing field,90 but for the time being, 
many of our nation’s poorest ex-convicts are hamstrung by records stemming from 
deficient process. Expungement cannot erase the trauma of negotiating the system 
alone, but it can shield these victims of conveyor-belt justice from stigma that might 
otherwise drive them back to prison.91 
III. IND. CODE § 35-38-5: INDIANA’S ORIGINAL EXPUNGEMENT STATUTE 
Having concluded that the benefits of robust expungement outweigh its costs, this 
Note now turns to evaluate the particularities of Indiana’s law. Prior to 2011, 
Hoosiers who wished to restrict access to their criminal records had few options. 
Indiana’s original “Expungement of Arrest Records” statute, enacted in 1983, 
provided that individuals could petition for expungement if they were arrested and 
released without charge or if the charges filed against them were dropped due to 
mistaken identity, no offense in fact, or absence of probable cause.92 For individuals 
who were actually convicted of a crime—even a low-level misdemeanor—there were 
no opportunities for expungement per se. If these individuals completed their 
sentences and waited fifteen years without incurring additional convictions, they could 
petition the Indiana State Police to restrict access to their records.93 Even so, agencies 
that had previously obtained the records were under no obligation to seal or destroy 
them. Furthermore, while the statute provided that law enforcement officials who 
violated its terms could face charges, no such sanctions applied to private actors.94 
Case law confirms the harsh and sometimes arbitrary limitations imposed by the 
original expungement statute. In Kleiman v. State, the petitioner sought to expunge 
his arrest record after he was acquitted of a Class A misdemeanor charge for public 
indecency.95 The Court of Appeals of Indiana found that the petitioner did not qualify 
for expungement because the state did not drop all charges against him.96 In a similar 
vein, the court of appeals in Blake v. State found that an ex-convict who served out 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. Carrie Johnson, Legal Advocates Want Overhaul of Public Defender System, NPR 
(Oct. 2, 2013, 6:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/10/02/228572418/legal
-advocates-want-overhaul-of-public-defender-system (discussing such impediments as 
flat-fee public defender contracts and cash bail systems). 
 90. Cf. infra notes 234–235 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 92. IND. CODE § 35-38-5-1(a) (2008) (repealed 2014). 
 93. § 35-38-5-5 (2008). Even this limited remedy had its own limitations: it did not apply to 
petitioners who had volunteered to provide childcare in conjunction with a social service or 
nonprofit agency, and it did not apply to petitioners who owed child support. See § 10-13-3-27(a)(8), 
(12) (2010). 
 94. See § 35-38-5-6 (2008). 
 95. 590 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 
 96. Id. at 663; cf. Smith v. State, No. 41A04-0608-CV-441, 2007 WL 1815706 (Ind. Ct. 
App. June 26, 2007) (unpublished) (finding that where state withdrew charges for unknown 
reason and petitioner could not fit his argument within the narrow provisions of chapter 5, 
petitioner could not qualify for expungement). 
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his sentence and subsequently obtained a gubernatorial pardon was not entitled to 
expungement of his arrest records: the statute did not reach such circumstances.97 
In State ex rel. Indiana State Police v. Arnold, the Indiana Supreme Court carved 
out some additional space for would-be petitioners with multiple arrests on record.98 
In so doing, the court abrogated State v. Reynolds, an earlier decision by the court of 
appeals. In Reynolds, the court had interpreted the expungement statute to 
categorically exclude petitioners who had additional charges pending against them.99 
The Arnold court rejected this hardline analysis, finding that the statute’s overall 
“animating principle” was one of trial court discretion.100 
While Arnold seemingly broadened the pool of potential petitioners, just two 
years later, the court of appeals in Zagorac v. State reaffirmed key limitations of the 
expungement statute.101 After the state filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of a 
victim’s inability to testify, the petitioner sought to expunge his arrest record.102 The 
trial court declined to grant expungement, and the petitioner appealed, arguing that 
the statute violated the privileges and immunities clause of Indiana’s state 
constitution.103 Expungement was available under chapter 5, section 1 if charges 
were never filed or if they were dropped under qualifying circumstances.104 Records 
could be sealed under section 5 for petitioners who actually served out their sentences 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. 860 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The Blake court did grant the petitioner an 
expungement of his conviction records (as opposed to his arrest records), relying not on any 
statutory provision but rather on a principle from case law. Id. at 631. The pertinent distinction 
was that chapter 5 spoke explicitly to arrest records while saying nothing about conviction 
records, and thus the court was free to act in equity. 
 98. 906 N.E.2d 167 (Ind. 2009). 
 99. 774 N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The Reynolds court based its analysis on 
the following statutory text: 
After a hearing is held under this section, the petition shall be granted unless the 
court finds: (1) the conditions . . . have not been met; (2) the individual has a 
record of arrests other than minor traffic offenses; or (3) additional criminal 
charges are pending against the individual. 
§ 35-38-5-1(f) (2008) (repealed 2014). 
 100. Arnold, 906 N.E.2d at 171. In reaching its determination, the Arnold court 
hypothesized that an unlucky person could be twice arrested in cases of mistaken identity. The 
court concluded that the legislature surely intended discretion in such a situation. Id. Shortly 
after Arnold, the court of appeals took up Gerber v. State, a case in which the petitioner sought 
expungement after the state elected not to file charges in connection with a domestic dispute. 
912 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The trial judge denied the petition, opining that a 
reasonable period of time had not passed since the petitioner’s arrest and ruling that petitioners 
must wait for the statute of limitations to run before seeking expungement. Id. at 387–88. In 
another decision favorable to petitioners, the court of appeals held that in spite of his 
considerable discretion, the trial judge was not authorized to rewrite the statute. Id. at 390–91. 
 101. 943 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  
 102. Id. at 386. 
 103. Id. at 392; see also IND. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The General Assembly shall not grant to 
any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall 
not equally belong to all citizens.”). 
 104. See § 35-38-5-1(a) (2008) (repealed 2014). 
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and avoided further convictions for fifteen years.105 But for petitioners who fell 
between the statutory bookends, no relief was available. 
The court of appeals agreed that it seemed counterintuitive to “provide a form of 
relief to convicted persons when that relief is unavailable to persons who have not 
been convicted.” 106  Unfortunately, because the petitioner had not raised his 
constitutional argument in the proceedings below, the court declined to decide the 
issue.107 Taken with Arnold, however, Zagorac signaled a sea change in expungement 
law. It is against this backdrop of litigation that the state legislature acted, first in 2011 
and then during the 118th General Assembly, crafting a statutory alternative for 
ex-convicts who could not satisfy the stringent requirements of chapter 5.108 
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE OVERHAUL: PARSING IND. CODE § 35-38-9 
In 2013, under the leadership of Representative Jud McMillin (R-Brookville), the 
General Assembly enacted a comprehensive expungement bill with wide bipartisan 
support.109 During the 2013 legislative recess, Representative McMillin met with 
government officials and attorneys across the state; they discussed the strengths of 
the new law and areas where it might be tweaked to simplify the process. 110 
Representative McMillin brought these recommendations back to the statehouse; the 
statute was amended as of March 26, 2014,111 and is in effect as of this writing. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See § 35-38-5-5(b) (2008). 
 106. Zagorac, 943 N.E.2d at 394. 
 107. Id. 
 108. The General Assembly passed a stopgap “Restricted Access to Criminal Records” 
statute in 2011; this statute created additional opportunities for persons convicted of low-level 
crimes to seek expungement after an eight-year waiting period. Act of May 10, 2011, No. 194, 
2011 Ind. Acts 2489 (codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 35-38-5-5.5, -8-1 to -7 (Supp. 2011) 
(repealed 2013)). The 2011 statute met with mixed reviews: as Nicole Porter, state advocacy 
coordinator for the D.C.-based Sentencing Project, observed, “[Indiana] passed a law that only 
expunges very low-level offenders after eight years. . . . It’s good that [Indiana] just passed that 
policy, but there’s a lot of work that still needs to be done.” New Indiana Law Lets Ex-Offenders 
Close Records, HERALD BULL. (July 5, 2011), http://www.heraldbulletin.com/archives
/article_67baf5d0-f208-5a39-b849-77877d9c092c.html. 
 109. H.B. 1482, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013). As amended, the bill passed 
the Indiana Senate with a vote of 39 to 11; it passed the House with a vote of 78 to 19. Action 
List: House Bill 1482, IND. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.in.gov/apps/lsa/session/billwatch
/billinfo?year=2013&request=getActions&doctype=HB&docno=1482. Andrew Cullen of the 
Indiana Public Defender Council observed that expungement “brings folks who are often at 
different ends of the political spectrum together. . . . Legislators of a conservative nature believe 
in redemption while legislators of a more liberal nature believe in the concept of second chances.” 
Marilyn Odendahl, Giving Felons a Chance To Wipe Their Records Clean, IND. LAW. (Feb. 27. 
2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/article/print?articleId=30843. 
 110. Hannah Troyer, Bill That Tweaks Expungement Law Headed to Full House, 
THESTATEHOUSEFILE.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://thestatehousefile.com/bill-tweaks
-expungement-law-headed-full-house/14464/. 
 111. Act of Mar. 26, 2014, No. 181, 2014 Ind. Acts. 2291 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of IND. CODE tit. 35 (Supp. 2014)). 
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Under section 1 of Indiana’s amended expungement statute (chapter 9 of title 35, 
article 38), persons who have been arrested but not convicted or whose convictions 
have been vacated on appeal may petition for expungement not earlier than one year 
after their date of arrest or the final order vacating their conviction.112 For qualifying 
petitioners who have no criminal charges pending, courts are required to grant 
expungement: as a practical matter, this means that no information concerning the 
expunged arrest may be retained in the Indiana Central Repository or in “any other 
alphabetically arranged criminal history information system” maintained by an Indiana 
law enforcement agency.113 However, relief under section 1 is not exhaustive: law 
enforcement agencies and courts are not required to alter their internal records, and 
records pertaining to pretrial diversion or deferral programs are not affected.114 
The next four sections of chapter 9 present the requirements for expungement of 
conviction records.115 Sections 2 and 3 describe mandatory expungement, while 
sections 4 and 5 describe discretionary expungement. 116  Certain baseline 
requirements apply across all four sections.117 Each section establishes a waiting 
period triggered by either the date of conviction or the completion of the sentence.118 
Under the 2013 version of the statute, all petitioners were required to pay a civil filing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. § 35-38-9-1 (Supp. 2014). The prosecuting attorney may agree in writing to an earlier 
petition. § 35-38-9-1(b) (Supp. 2014). 
 113. § 35-38-9-1(f) (Supp. 2014). Under the 2013 version of the statute, in which a 
substantially similar process was known as “sealing,” a defendant who had survived two mistrials 
and for whom all charges were dropped filed a petition to seal her criminal history. The court 
confirmed that it had no discretion but was required to seal the petitioner’s records based on the 
qualifying factors of section 1. See Madeline Buckley, Prosecutors Rip Indiana’s New ‘2nd 
Chance Law,’ IND. ECON. DIG. (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:28 PM), http://www.indianaeconomicdigest.net
/main.asp?SectionID=31&subsectionID=224&articleID=71892. 
 114. § 35-38-9-1(f)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2014). Furthermore, as of the 2014 amendments, if a 
former arrestee files suit in a case in which expunged arrest records could provide a complete 
defense, that former arrestee has the burden to prove that the contents of her records would not 
exonerate the defendant under the circumstances of her case. See § 35-38-9-1(g) (Supp. 2014). 
 115. Strangely, sections 2 and 3 make no mention of juvenile delinquency adjudications. 
In fact, after three legislative endeavors in 2011, 2013, and 2014, juvenile record expungement 
remains the province of an older statute that affords unchecked discretion to trial courts. See 
infra notes 206–16 and accompanying text. 
 116. The mandatory expungement provisions stipulate that a court “shall” order the 
conviction records of a qualifying petitioner expunged. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(d) (Supp. 2014). The 
discretionary provisions indicate that a court “may” order the records expunged. E.g., 
§ 35-38-9-4(e) (Supp. 2014). Chapter 9 addresses misdemeanor and felony convictions only: 
in a separate Act enacted in 2013, prior law that automatically restricted access to infraction 
records after five years was replaced with new statutory language requiring petitions similar 
to those for misdemeanor expungement. Act of Apr. 29, 2013, No. 112, § 7, 2013 Ind. Acts 
811, 814–18 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 34-28-5-15 (Supp. 2014)). 
 117. Qualifying petitioners must prove by preponderance of the evidence that they have no 
charges pending against them and they must have paid all fines, fees, court costs, and 
restitution obligations. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 118. These waiting periods can be adjusted with the prosecutor’s written consent. E.g., 
§ 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014). 
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fee. 119  The statute expressly denied a waiver or reduction for indigence. 120  The 
waiver proscription was among the provisions eliminated by the 2014 amendments: 
according to the Division of State Court Administration, low-income petitioners may 
now qualify for a waiver just as in other civil actions.121 
Under the mandatory expungement procedures, persons convicted of 
misdemeanors (including Class D or Level 6 felonies reduced to Class A 
misdemeanors122) may petition for expungement not earlier than five years after their 
date of conviction, assuming they have received no additional convictions during that 
period.123 The policy is similar for persons convicted of most nonviolent Class D or 
Level 6 felonies, although they have a waiting period of eight years.124 
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. Indiana’s civil filing fee, which includes a baseline fee increased by administrative and 
pro bono service fees, currently stands at $141. See § 33-37-4-4 (Supp. 2014); LILIA G. JUDSON, 
DIV. OF STATE COURT ADMIN., IND. SUPREME COURT, INDIANA TRIAL COURT FEE MANUAL 7 
(2013), available at http://www.state.in.us/judiciary/admin/files/pubs-fee-manual.pdf. 
 120. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(c) (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). 
 121. See Marcia Oddi, Ind. Courts—The New Expungement Changes Took Effect March 
26th. What Are They?, IND. L. BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:27 AM), http://indianalawblog.com
/archives/2014/04/ind_courts_the_47.html. Civil litigants in Indiana may ordinarily avoid 
court costs by declaring under oath that they are indigent. Litigants who are represented by 
Indiana Legal Services, a statewide legal aid program, may qualify for a waiver if their 
attorneys vouch for their indigency. § 33-37-3-2 (2008). 
 122. On May 6, 2013, Governor Pence signed H.B. 1006 into law: effective July 1, 2014, 
the statute overhauled Indiana’s sentencing requirements. Act of May 6, 2013, No. 158, 2013 
Ind. Acts 1155 (codified as amended in scattered sections of IND. CODE (Supp. 2014)). The 
overhaul introduced harsher punishments and fewer early-release options for violent criminals 
and sex offenders while reducing the penalties for nonviolent crimes and empowering judges 
with greater discretion to place low-level offenders into community-based correction 
programs or substance abuse treatment rather than the state penitentiary system. Maureen 
Hayden, New Sentencing Laws Prompt Local Worries Around State, GREENSBURG DAILY NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.greensburgdailynews.com/local/x2117361225/New-sentencing
-laws-prompt-local-worries-around-state. 
One consequence of this overhaul was a change in the way felonies are graded: the former 
four-tier system (A–D) was converted to a six-tier system (1–6). IND. LAW BLOG, CRIMINAL 
CODE REVISION BILL SUMMARY (2013), available at http://indianalawblog.com/documents
/Criminal%20Code%20Revision%20bill_%20Summary%20document-1.pdf. Under the new 
scheme, Class D felonies are classified as Level 6, Class C felonies are classified as Level 5, 
Class B felonies are divided between Levels 3 and 4 based on severity, and Class A felonies 
are divided between Levels 1 and 2 based on severity. Id. Misdemeanors are unaffected. Id. 
The 2014 amendments to the expungement statute accounted for this change: as a result, 
sections 2 through 5 reference both the old four-tier system and the new six-tier system. 
 123. § 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014). The prosecutor may consent in writing to an 
earlier period. The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently clarified that persons who previously 
obtained court-ordered dismissal of misdemeanor convictions may qualify for subsequent 
expungement. In J.B. v. State, the court noted that a judicially ordered dismissal would have 
been “meaningless if the records concerning that conviction were to remain accessible,” and 
it could not “conclude that the General Assembly would have intended such a result.” No. 
53A01-1408-CR-367, 2015 WL 1035487, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015). 
 124. § 35-38-9-3(c), (e)(4) (Supp. 2014). Again, the prosecutor may consent to an earlier 
period. Although section 3 excludes from coverage those felony convictions stemming from 
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Under the discretionary expungement procedures of section 4, persons convicted 
of many nonviolent felonies may file their petitions at the later of eight years after 
their date of conviction or three years after completing their sentence, unless the 
prosecutor consents in writing to an earlier period.125 Section 5 enumerates the 
requirements for expungement of more serious felonies, including those committed 
by an elected official or those resulting in “serious bodily injury.”126 Petitioners must 
wait until the later of ten years after their date of conviction or five years after 
completing their sentence, unless the prosecutor consents in writing to an earlier 
period. 127  Unique to section 5, petitioners must obtain the prosecutor’s written 
consent to proceed with the expungement process even if they satisfy the statutory 
waiting period.128 
                                                                                                                 
 
“bodily injury to another person,” § 35-38-9-3(b)(3), the Court of Appeals of Indiana held in 
a March 2015 opinion that “facts from the same incident that do not result in a felony 
conviction cannot be taken into consideration when determining whether a person is 
disqualified from expungement.” Trout v. State, No. 12A04-1409-MI-403, 2015 WL 1186077, 
at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2015). In Trout, the petitioner was convicted of criminal 
recklessness with a deadly weapon and pointing a firearm, both Class D felonies. He was 
acquitted of attempted murder. Although the petitioner did not dispute that he shot and injured 
his victim, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that it could not “turn 
a blind eye to the facts of the entire case.” Id. at *3. The language of the expungement statute 
is clear: “a person is ineligible for mandatory expungement if they were convicted of a felony 
and that felony resulted in bodily injury to another person.” Id. (emphasis added). In Trout’s 
case, whatever other misconduct he may have engaged in during the course of the crime, his 
only convictions fit the requirements for expungement under section 3. 
 125. § 35-38-9-4(c) (Supp. 2014). The statute does not identify precisely what constitutes 
completion of a sentence—but qualifying language in the 2013 version that required 
petitioners to complete any term of supervised release was eliminated by the 2014 
amendments. Compare § 35-38-9-4(c) (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), with § 35-38-9-4(c) 
(Supp. 2014). See also Alvey v. State, No. 20A04-1310-MI-533, 2014 WL 3857228 (Ind. Ct. 
App. Aug. 6, 2014) (affirming denial of expungement petition where petitioner twice violated 
the terms of his probation but recognizing that petitioner may seek relief under the more liberal 
standards of the revised statute), aff’g 10 N.E.3d 1031 (2014). 
Under current law, petitioners must also prove that they have not been convicted of any 
crime within the past eight years, though the prosecutor may override this requirement. 
§ 35-38-9-4(e)(4) (Supp. 2014). 
 126. § 35-38-9-5(a) (Supp. 2014). The Code defines “serious bodily injury” to include 
injuries that cause a substantial risk of death or impairment, disfigurement, unconsciousness, 
extreme pain, or miscarriage. § 35-31.5-2-292 (Supp. 2014). While such language conveys 
gruesome imagery, courts have construed the term broadly. See, e.g., Lipka v. State, 479 
N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1985) (quarter-inch laceration in proximity of vital organs, without actually 
impacting those organs, constituted serious bodily injury); Chidebelu-Eze v. State, No. 
49A02-1308-CR-720, 2014 WL 2192382 (Ind. Ct. App. May 27, 2014) (unpublished slip 
opinion) (head-butt resulting in concussion constituted serious bodily injury). 
 127. § 35-38-9-5(c) (Supp. 2014). Like the other sections, section 5 has a “clean hands” 
requirement: petitioners must prove that they have not been convicted of any crime within the past 
ten years, though the prosecutor may override this requirement. § 35-38-9-5(e)(4) (Supp. 2014). 
 128. § 35-38-9-5(e)(5) (Supp. 2014). 
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Under Indiana law, no relief is available for persons formerly convicted of official 
misconduct, kidnapping, human trafficking, homicide, or sex crimes.129 
The results of a successful petition for expungement hinge on the grade of the 
underlying offense. For section 2 misdemeanors and section 3 Class D / Level 6 
felonies, courts must order the Department of Corrections, the BMV, and other law 
enforcement or treatment agencies to prohibit the release of affected records except 
to police or persons with a court order.130 Courts must also order the Indiana Central 
Repository to seal the records, and they must ensure that related judicial opinions are 
redacted.131 Notably, Indiana’s expungement statute—unlike statutes in some other 
jurisdictions132—does not mandate that expunged records be destroyed. This was not 
a legislative oversight: the statute provides for a number of circumstances in which 
expunged records may be disclosed. For instance, a prosecutor may obtain expunged 
records from the Central Repository if she requires them to carry out of her official 
duties and if she obtains a court order.133 The statute provides similar access for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. § 35-38-9-5(b) (Supp. 2014). Presumably the public would balk at expungement for 
persons convicted of murder or rape; hesitation might well be warranted for such serious 
crimes. That said, it seems less obvious to categorically withhold relief from persons convicted 
of official misconduct as defined under Indiana law. See § 35-44.1-1-1 (Supp. 2014) (defining 
official misconduct to include knowing commission of an offense by a public servant, 
acceptance of a bribe, transacting based on confidential information, or failure to deliver public 
records to a successor servant); see also State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 2003) (allowing 
charge of official misconduct for state excise officer who accepted modest kickbacks from 
liquor merchandiser). 
 130. § 35-38-9-6(a)(1) (Supp. 2014). 
 131. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2), (c) (Supp. 2014). 
 132. See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 920 (2014) (“An order for the expungement of 
juvenile court records must be in writing and, except as hereinafter provided, must require that 
the clerk of court destroy all records relating to the conduct or conditions referred to in the 
motion for expungement, including but not limited to pleadings, exhibits, reports, minute 
entries, correspondence, and all other documents.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7606(d)(3)–(4) 
(Supp. 2013) (“Inspection of the expungement order and the certificate may be permitted only 
upon petition by the person who is the subject of the case or by the court if the court finds that 
inspection of the documents is necessary to serve the interest of justice. . . . All other court 
documents in a case that are subject to an expungement order shall be destroyed.”). But see In 
re Kollman, 46 A.3d 1247, 1254 (N.J. 2012) (“When a court orders expungement, criminal 
records are extracted and isolated, but not destroyed . . . .” (citation omitted) (citing N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:52-1 (2005))). 
 133. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2014). The requirement of a court order may provide 
some reassurance for formerly convicted persons who might worry about the vague 
prosecutorial power to obtain records if “needed to carry out [their] official duties.” Yet in 
subsection (d), the statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding subsection (b), a prosecuting 
attorney may submit a written application to a court that granted an expungement petition . . . 
to gain access to any records that were permanently sealed . . . if the records are relevant in a 
new prosecution.” If the prosecutor shows that the records are “relevant,” an undefined term 
in the statute, the court is then required to release the records to the prosecutor, who may 
introduce them into evidence in the new proceeding. § 35-38-9-6(d) (Supp. 2014). As a 
practical matter, then, a former offender’s expunged records may well come back to haunt him 
if he finds himself at odds with the law once more, even if he is not actually convicted of a 
subsequent offense. 
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defense attorneys, probation departments, and federal investigative agencies, and it 
likewise provides access for persons who require expunged records to comply with 
the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act and its companion 
regulations.134 As of 2014, the statute also provides that expunged records may be 
released to the state board of law examiners or its employees for the purpose of 
determining whether a bar applicant possesses “good moral character” (the so-called 
“character-and-fitness” test).135 
For section 4 and 5 felonies, arrest and conviction records remain in the public 
domain, but courts will order these records to be marked as expunged. 136  Law 
enforcement and other agencies must add an entry to their databases indicating that 
the records have been marked as expunged.137 
Perhaps the most critical, yet easily overlooked, element of the statute is the 
“one-bite-at-the-apple” limitation of section 9(i). This provision stipulates that 
petitioners may generally qualify for expungement only once in a lifetime.138 If a 
petitioner has convictions in multiple counties, she must file in each county within a 
one-year period.139  If her petition is denied, she may file a subsequent petition 
covering those offenses she originally sought to expunge, although in cases of 
discretionary expungement (sections 4 and 5), the petitioner must wait three years 
before submitting a subsequent petition.140 Under the 2013 version of the law, the 
one-bite-at-the-apple limitation was particularly severe for low-income, pro se 
petitioners: it permitted only one petition in a lifetime, and it made no 
accommodation for excusable neglect or an honest mistake (for example, failing to 
list an old-and-cold offense or omitting a mandatory element of the petition).141 The 
2014 amendments made this provision fairer for pro se petitioners: now, a court may 
permit a petitioner to file a subsequent petition with respect to convictions not 
originally included if the court finds that the petitioner intended to comply with the 
statute’s requirement but failed due to excusable neglect or circumstances beyond 
her control.142 Even so, courts have discretion to permit or deny subsequent petitions 
based on “the best interests of justice.”143 Because the amended language is quite 
new, no appellate courts have reviewed a denial of subsequent expungement for 
abuse of discretion—but it seems that results may vary across the state given the 
legislature’s failure to supply particular criteria and given that some judges are 
publicly opposed to the law.144 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2)(B)–(D), (F) (Supp. 2014); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5104 (2012) 
(discussing background check and other requirements for loan origination licenses); FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, at V-14.1 (2014), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/V-14.1.pdf. 
 135. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2)(E) (Supp. 2014). 
 136. § 35-38-9-7(b) (Supp. 2014). 
 137. § 35-38-9-7(c) (Supp. 2014). 
 138. § 35-38-9-9(h) (Supp. 2014). 
 139. Id. 
 140. § 35-38-9-9(i) (Supp. 2014). 
 141. § 35-38-9-9(j) (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). 
 142. § 35-38-9-9(j) (Supp. 2014). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Prosecutors: Expungement Law Has Good, Bad Sides, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (July 
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The final sections of chapter 9 represent a legislative effort to put some teeth into 
the new statute. Section 10 clarifies that discrimination on the basis of an expunged 
record is unlawful.145 Now, job applications that ask about criminal histories may do 
so only in terms that “exclude expunged convictions or arrests.”146 Persons who 
discriminate on the basis of an expunged record commit a Class C infraction and may 
be held in contempt of court. 147  Victims of such discrimination may sue for 
injunctive relief.148 Section 11, the final section of the statute, was added by the 2014 
amendments: it provides that a defendant may not waive the right to expungement 
via a plea agreement and that purported waivers are void as against public policy.149 
V. THE AFTERMATH OF CHAPTER 9: PUBLIC PRAISE, PROSECUTORIAL PERPLEXITY 
The passage of the 2013 expungement statute generated ample publicity, with 
small law firms in particular investing in advertisements and editorials to attract new 
clients.150 Andre Patterson, outreach coordinator for the Office of Diversity and 
                                                                                                                 
 
20, 2014), http://www.ibj.com/prosecutors-expungement-law-has-good-bad-sides/PARAMS
/article/48674 [hereinafter Prosecutors on Expungement] (“Morgan Superior Court Judge G. 
Thomas Gray, a former prosecutor, said he dislikes the expungement process and objects to a 
provision that says victims can address the court, but the judge cannot consider their testimony 
if the expungement fits the statute.”). 
 145. § 35-38-9-10(b) (Supp. 2014). The statute prohibits suspension, expulsion, refusal to 
employ, refusal to admit, refusal to license, and any other discrimination on the basis of sealed 
or expunged records. Id. 
 146. § 35-38-9-10(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 147. § 35-38-9-10(f) (Supp. 2014). Elsewhere in the Code, a Class C infraction is defined 
as a civil offense with a penalty of up to $500. § 34-28-5-4(c) (2008). Funds collected through 
the administration of such a penalty are deposited into the state’s general fund. § 34-28-5-5(c) 
(2008). Contempt is a somewhat looser concept: “indirect contempt,” most applicable here, 
applies to willful disobedience of a process or order and may give rise to a fine, imprisonment, 
or both. §§ 34-47-3-1, -6 (2008). In Davis v. Sponhauer, the court of appeals held that 
punishment for contempt is left to the “sound discretion of the trial court.” 574 N.E.2d 292, 
302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
 148. § 35-38-9-10(f) (Supp. 2014). Almost simultaneously with passage of the 2013 
expungement statute, and as a companion provision to the section 10 remedies, the General 
Assembly modified title 24 trade regulations concerning the management and dissemination 
of criminal records. Act of Apr. 29, 2013, No. 112, §§ 1–6, 2013 Ind. Acts 811, 811–14 
(codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 24-4-18-1 to -8 (Supp. 2014)). Per the amended 
provisions, criminal history providers must not knowingly release information pertaining to 
expunged records. § 24-4-18-6(a)(1) (Supp. 2014). A knowing violation is actionable as a 
“deceptive act.” § 24-4-18-8(a) (Supp. 2014). Persons injured by such an act are entitled to 
sue for damages. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (Supp. 2014). The Assembly’s choice to apply civil deception 
remedies in cases of unlawful dissemination is puzzling. It appears that a plaintiff seeking to 
recover damages would be required to show that she relied to her detriment on an “uncured or 
incurable” deceptive act. Id. Perhaps a plaintiff who was denied employment due to a 
wrongfully disseminated record would have a justiciable cause of action. 
 149. § 35-38-9-11 (Supp. 2014). It seems that this provision may represent a partial 
legislative response to arguments raised by Prosecutor Steve Sonnega in the Combs dispute. 
See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., Indianapolis Expungement Law Attorneys, WINKLERYORKLAW.COM, 
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Multicultural Affairs at Indiana University–Purdue University Fort Wayne, noted 
that more than 160 people registered for a training session on the new law, while 
others waited in line for hours to attend the session. 151  Marion County Deputy 
Prosecutor Andrew Fogle said that his office received between thirty and forty 
petitions within the first two months.152 
Despite the enthusiasm of petitioners, some legal professionals raised concerns 
about the operation or potential consequences of the statute. In a July 2013 interview, 
Judge Fran Gull of the Allen Superior Court cautioned that courts did not have a 
sufficient framework in place to process the potential deluge of petitions.153 She also 
warned that petitioners should seek qualified counsel before filing, given the complex 
eligibility requirements and the “one-bite-at-the-apple” provision.154  Allen County 
Deputy Prosecutor Michael McAlexander echoed Judge Gull’s concerns, observing 
that an ex-offender in her early twenties might hesitate to petition the court if there was 
a chance she might encounter legal problems later in life.155 Deputy Prosecutor Fogle 
raised a different concern: while the statute requires the prosecuting attorney to “inform 
the victim of the victim’s rights . . . by contacting the victim at the victim’s last known 
address,”156 such a feat is easier said than done for decades-old convictions.157 
Other prosecutors expressed concern less with the statute’s practical workings and 
more with its policy implications. Shelby County Prosecutor Kent Apsley remarked 
derisively that “[f]rom an offender’s standpoint, this law is, obviously, a huge 
                                                                                                                 
 
http://www.winkleryorklaw.com/expungement/; Peterson Waggoner & Perkins, LLP, 
Expungement of Criminal Records in Indiana, YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ld5TAN2wlaI. 
 151. Frank Gray, Thirst Acute for Info on Sealing Crime Files, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, 
Oct. 15, 2013, at 1C. 
 152. Ryckaert, supra note 20. In a public relations debacle, between two hundred and three 
hundred people crowded into the Marion County Clerk’s Office on July 1, 2013, believing that 
expungement was available for one day only. Dave Stafford, Complexity of New Expungement 
Law Raises Questions, IND. LAW. (July 17, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com
/complexity-of-new-expungement-law-raises-questions/PARAMS/article/31913. 
 153. Law Allowing Expungement Creating Legal Confusion, POST-TRIB., July 27, 2013, 
http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/21566608-418/law-allowing-expungement-creating-legal-
confusion.html. 
 154. Id. The statute in effect at the time of Judge Gull’s comments offered no apparent 
relief for pro se petitioners who filed improperly or who inadvertently omitted an offense. As 
amended in 2014, the statute offers higher tolerance for excusable neglect, although the 
general rule of once-in-a-lifetime expungement remains the law. See supra notes 141–43 and 
accompanying text. 
 155. Id. McAlexander’s concern is grounded in a practical understanding of recidivism: over 
one-third of Indiana’s adult inmates are reincarcerated within three years of their release. IND. 
DEP’T OF CORR., ADULT RECIDIVISM RATES (2012), available at http://www.in.gov/idoc
/files/2012_Adult_Recidivism_Summary.pdf. Even if a youthful ex-offender has every intention 
of staying on course for the duration of her life, the idea of a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity can 
chill young adults facing decades of experiences, surprises, and, inevitably, mistakes. 
 156. IND. CODE § 35-38-9-8(e) (Supp. 2014). 
 157. Stafford, supra note 152. For crimes committed long before digitized records, tracking 
down victims may prove impossible, especially for rural prosecutors’ offices with small staffs 
and limited resources. 
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benefit. They can essentially wipe out a whole lifetime of crime.” 158  Apsley 
described the “big losers” as employers who are prohibited, under section 10, from 
asking about nonexpunged crimes. 159  Allen County Prosecutor Karen Richards 
agreed that employers have a legitimate interest in making informed decisions.160 
While most criticism of the expungement law has fallen along predictable policy 
lines, some critics have posed more nuanced legal arguments. On October 18, 2013, 
Morgan County Prosecutor Steve Sonnega asked Judge Matthew Hanson to declare 
the statute unconstitutional.161 Sonnega attacked the statute on several bases: he 
argued, for instance, that the statute undermined judicial discretion through its 
mandatory expungement provisions, 162  and he contended that the legislature’s 
introduction of expungement law unconstitutionally interfered with plea bargain 
“contracts” established under prior law. 163  The crux of Sonnega’s argument, 
however, was that the expungement statute violates the state constitution’s 
requirement that victims of crimes must be treated with dignity.164 While victims are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Paul Gable, Apsley Uncertain of New State Law, SHELBYVILLE NEWS, Aug. 17, 2013, 
available at 2013 WLNR 20466953. 
 159. Id. Jackson County Prosecutor AmyMarie Travis also expressed concern that 
ex-convicts might conceal past indiscretions, such as internal theft, from potential employers, 
though she admitted that she would urge her own family members to take advantage of the law 
if it would benefit them. Aubrey Woods, Indiana Expungement Law Gives Woman a Fresh Start, 
COURIER-JOURNAL (Mar. 30, 2014, 3:05 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local
/indiana/2014/03/30/indiana-expungement-law-gives-woman-fresh-start/7084151/. 
 160. Editorial, Expunge with Care, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2013, at 6A. In fact, 
the legislature did take account of employer concerns in the new statute, providing that 
expunged records are inadmissible in negligent hiring suits. See § 35-38-9-10(g) (Supp. 2014). 
This safeguard may not address all employment-related issues, but it should soothe the 
trepidations of human resource managers fearful of lawsuits. 
One might argue that the concerns voiced by Prosecutors Apsley and Richards overlook 
the possibility of bona fide rehabilitation. Recidivism in Indiana declined five percent from 
2011 to 2012, paralleling similar and even sharper declines in other states. Fewer Reformed 
Criminals Return to Prison, WNDU.COM (Mar. 6, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.wndu.com
/home/headlines/Fewer-reformed-criminals-return-to-prison-195527471.html [hereinafter 
WNDU Article]; Letter from Danny K. Davis, supra note 82. State-sponsored courses in 
substance abuse awareness, anger management, and vocational training may be partly to credit 
for the decline; federal investment through the Second Chance Act has undoubtedly helped as 
well. WNDU Article, supra; see also Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 
Stat. 657 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). That said, over one-third 
of Indiana’s adult inmates are reincarcerated within three years of their release, so Apsley’s 
and Richards’s concerns are not without merit. See supra note 155; but see supra notes 49–50 
(arguing that elimination of rap-sheet stigma may offset the economic desperation that often 
leads to recidivism). It is worth noting that if an ex-convict recidivates within a three-year 
period, he will probably not qualify for expungement anyway, as the statutory waiting period 
for the lowest-level offenses is five years. § 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014). 
 161. Tim Evans, Law Erasing Criminal Records Faces Challenge, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, 
Oct. 28, 2013, at A1. 
 162. Combs v. State, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. paras. 9–10 (Morgan Cnty. Cir. 
Ct. Oct. 28, 2013). 
 163. Id. slip. op. para. 25. 
 164. Id. slip. op. para. 51; see also IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (“Victims of crime, as defined 
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invited to submit statements supporting or opposing the expungement petition, “the 
law does not give a judge any leeway to consider that input.”165 
In an October 28 order, Judge Hanson rejected most of Sonnega’s arguments. 
However, he agreed that section 9’s solicitation of victim input is incompatible with 
the earlier provisions that “do not require a consideration of a victim’s statement 
before they ‘shall’ grant an expungement.”166 Thus, Judge Hanson concluded, “the 
statute is ineffectual when it comes to victim’s [sic] rights and therefore violates the 
Indiana Constitution.”167 In spite of his conclusion, Judge Hanson did not strike 
down any portion of the statute—because the case at hand concerned a DUI offense 
for which “there really [was] no victim.”168 
Judge Hanson’s decision to forego invalidation in spite of his misgivings was an 
eminently reasonable expression of judicial restraint.169 Moreover, it is not clear that 
Sonnega had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute in the first 
instance.170 Citing to a recent Indiana Supreme Court case, Professor Joel Schumm 
of the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law observed that “the 
State is the State,” and the “Attorney General, the State official charged with 
defending the constitutionality of state statutes, cannot be too pleased that the State 
(through a deputy prosecutor) is alleging a statute unconstitutional.”171 
                                                                                                                 
 
by law, shall have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the 
criminal justice process.”). 
 165. Evans, supra note 161. 
 166. Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 47. Judge Hanson’s order came 
down months before the 2014 amendments were enacted. Under the version of the statute in 
effect at the time of Judge Hanson’s order, section 9(d) provided that “[t]he court shall consider 
the victims statement before making its determination.” The General Assembly eliminated this 
language in 2014, but the statute still welcomes victim input—and arguably, Sonnega’s 
complaint is stronger now that the statute does not require judges to consider the input they 
receive. As Sonnega himself observed in a July 2014 interview, “There’s not much leeway for 
a prosecutor or judge, and granting these [petitions] becomes perfunctory, and that bothers 
me.” Prosecutors on Expungement, supra note 144. 
 167. Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 53. 
 168. Id. slip op. para. 54. 
 169. To strike down a statute on the basis of harm to a nonexistent party would seem to 
violate the Indiana Supreme Court’s dictate that “[w]hen a statute can be construed to support 
its constitutionality, such construction must be adopted.” Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 71 
(Ind. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute, IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (2008). 
Furthermore, while Indiana’s constitution lacks a “case or controversy” provision equivalent 
to the requirement of Article III, the Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that “the 
separation of powers language in Art. III, § 1 fulfills an analogous function” in judicial activity 
or inactivity. Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 336–
37 (Ind. 1994); see also IND. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The powers of the Government are divided 
into three separate departments . . . and no person, charged with official duties under one of 
these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution 
expressly provided.”). 
 170. See Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind. 1990) (describing 
standing as a principle confining courts to “resolving real controversies in which the 
complaining party has a demonstrable injury”). 
 171. Joel Schumm, State Constitutional Twilight Zone: Judges and Prosecutors Are 
Arguing Statutes Are Unconstitutional, IND. L. BLOG (Sept. 25, 2013, 12:27 PM), 
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Beyond the procedural impropriety of Sonnega’s claim, however, its merits 
warrant additional consideration. In concluding that “the dictates of sections 2–5 do 
not require a consideration of a victim’s statement before they ‘shall’ grant an 
expungement,”172 Judge Hanson appears to have misread the statute. While sections 
2 and 3 require a judge to grant expungement for qualifying petitioners (“shall 
order”), sections 4 and 5 are discretionary (“may order”), and section 5 requires the 
petitioner to obtain the prosecuting attorney’s consent.173 
Furthermore, both Sonnega and Judge Hanson seem to have assumed that victims 
have a stake in expungement proceedings that must be weighed against the interests 
of petitioners. Yet the statute is structured so that expungement is available only after 
a petitioner has completed her sentence,174 and the statute requires petitioners to have 
satisfied all costs, fees, and other financial obligations in connection with their 
conviction.175 Restitution, if demanded, has been paid; time, if ordered, has been 
served.176 The individual sentencing provisions of the Code make no mention of 
criminal records: as Judge Hanson himself suggested, these records are procedural 
(“norm[s] of doing business”) rather than substantive.177 Crimes and sentences are 
defined by the state legislature, a body democratically elected by a constituency that 
includes the victims of crimes. Once a convict has served out his sentence, he has 
done all that the law requires of him. Victims are constitutionally entitled to respect 
throughout prosecutions, and they are entitled to be present at public hearings178—
but they are not entitled to shape the outcomes of procedures, particularly for 
offenders who have served their time.179 
                                                                                                                 
 
http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2013/09/ind_courts_stat_61.html (quoting Becker v. 
State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 698 (Ind. 2013)). 
 172. Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 47. 
 173. See §§ 35-38-9-2(d), -3(e), -4(e), -5(e) (Supp. 2014). 
 174. For example, section 3—expungement of Class D and Level 6 felonies—provides that 
eight years must have elapsed since the date of the petitioner’s conviction. § 35-38-9-3(c) 
(Supp. 2014). Yet prison terms for Class D and Level 6 felons range from six months to three 
years, with the current advisory sentence being just one year. § 35-50-2-7(a)–(b) (Supp. 2014). 
The statute does provide that the prosecuting attorney may consent in writing to an earlier 
period. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(b) (Supp. 2014). However, it seems inconceivable that a prosecutor 
would consent to expungement while the petitioner is still serving time. 
 175. §§ 35-38-9-2(d)(3), -3(e)(3), -4(e)(3), -5(e)(3) (Supp. 2014). 
 176. Victims of heinous crimes may reasonably feel that no penalty, however severe, could 
offset the harm that has been done to them. But expungement is not available for the most 
serious crimes, such as homicide or rape. Furthermore, for victims who cannot obtain 
sufficient relief through the operation of criminal law, tort law provides time-honored 
remedies. See Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. 2005) (“Making 
a party ‘whole’ is the province of tort law . . . .”). 
 177. See Combs, No. 55C01-1308-MI-1392, slip op. para. 26. 
 178. IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b). The constitutional provision, however, pertains 
specifically to prosecutions, and it refers to the adverse party as the “accused.” It is not clear 
that this provision applies to postconviction hearings over procedural matters such as 
expungement. Cf. § 35-40-5-5 (2008) (authorizing victim input at proceedings involving 
sentencing and release but making no mention of expungement or criminal records). 
 179. In addition to the merits analysis, there are more practical considerations. As 
Martinsville attorney Glen Koch II observed, the legislature “wanted to make [expungement] 
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Although Judge Hanson left open the possibility that he would strike down the 
expungement statute if a future challenge involved an identifiable victim, the court 
of appeals likely foreclosed such a result in an April 2014 opinion.180 In Taylor v. 
State, the court considered a petition filed by Jason Taylor to expunge a decade-old 
misdemeanor conviction. Although Taylor met the requirements of section 2, the 
Lake County Superior Court denied his petition after his former victim testified that 
she “still suffers the effects of what [Taylor] did” and “believes that the punishment 
should fit the crime.”181 The version of the expungement statute in effect at the time 
of Taylor’s conviction included the language that most troubled Judge Hanson—that 
the court “shall consider the victim’s statement before making its determination.”182 
Chief Judge Vaidik, writing for the panel, agreed with Taylor that section 2 
unambiguously requires expungement if the petitioner satisfies all the requirements, 
and she pointed out that the use of “may” in sections 4 and 5 connotes legislative line 
drawing between proceedings in which courts have discretion and those in which 
they do not.183 Because Taylor satisfied the requirements of section 2, he was entitled 
to expungement—and the lower court erred in denying him relief.184 
Although the Taylor court did not evaluate constitutional arguments per se, its 
straightforward enforcement of mandatory expungement over a former victim’s 
protests renders it unlikely that a lower court will dare to strike the statute down.185 
Taylor signals that Indiana’s expungement law is here to stay. 
                                                                                                                 
 
easy and keep the costs down so these cases could be handled without getting into some big, 
drawn-out and expensive litigation.” Evans, supra note 161. 
 180. Taylor v. State, 7 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
 181. Id. at 364. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 365–66. 
 184. Id. at 367. An article in the Indianapolis Star published shortly after the Taylor 
decision suggested that the appellate court’s ruling will provide clarity for lower courts that 
may be reviewing expungement petitions filed under the 2013 version of the statute, with its 
conflicting “shalls” (shall consider the victim’s statement, shall order the records expunged). 
Quoting attorney Stephen Moell of Schererville, the article noted that Taylor “puts those who 
filed for expungement under the initial version of the law on equal footing with those who file 
now.” Tim Evans, Expungement Law Favors Reformed Criminals over Victims, Appeals Court 
Says, INDYSTAR (Apr. 24, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2014/04
/24/expungement-law-favors-criminals-victims-appeals-court-says/8096707/; see also Mallory 
v. State, No. 20A03-1403-MI-76, 2014 WL 4049802 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2014) (citing Taylor 
and holding that petitioner, who met all the requirements of section 35-38-9-3(e), was entitled to 
expungement of Class D felony theft conviction against victims’ wishes). 
 185. Cf. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges 
Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals 7 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 508, 2010) (“Except when they sit in a circuit with appellate judges who 
share their ideological preferences, district judges must choose between deciding cases that 
promote their ideological preferences and enjoying a high rate of affirmance. Since the former 
choice just means reversal and ultimately the failure to promote their ideological preferences, 
there is no choice at all. District judges will suppress their ideological leanings and decide 
cases so as to avoid reversal.”). 
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VI. RECOMMENDED REVISIONS 
Indiana’s expungement law represents a significant effort to counter the 
deleterious effects of rap-sheet stigma and to provide relief for ex-offenders who 
seek to lead productive, prosocial lives. The 2013 legislation established a solid 
statutory foundation; the 2014 amendments made the statute fairer and more 
accessible. 186  The General Assembly should be commended for its bipartisan 
commitment to second chances. That said, important legislation is often a work in 
progress,187 and the expungement statute could benefit from additional revisions and 
enhancements. 188  This final Part presents a variety of recommendations for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. For instance, the 2014 amendments eliminated the compulsory filing fee, see supra 
note 121, and granted courts discretion to overlook excusable filing errors, see supra note 142. 
 187. Cf. Nicholas Bala, A Report from Canada’s ‘Gender War Zone’: Reforming the 
Child-Related Provisions of the Divorce Act, 16 CAN. J. FAM. L. 163, 225 (1999) (“It must be 
recognized that the reform of child related laws will always be a ‘work-in-progress,’ being 
improved by legislators, judges and bureaucrats as more and better research becomes 
available.”); Patrick O. Gudridge, Complexity and Contradiction in Florida Constitutional 
Law, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 927 (2010) (“Legislative drafters can hardly be expected to 
monitor closely all parts of a bill and also its legislative history, at least in cases . . . in which 
the content of legislation is a work in progress.”); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Belonging: 
Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
330, 338 (2006) (“[T]he EU’s legal framework on nationality/citizenship and on migration 
remains a highly contested work in progress.”); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Key Environmental 
Legislation for Cuba’s Transition Period, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 364 (2000) (“The 
transition period in Cuba will likely be characterized by frequent and perhaps dramatic 
changes in economic and political conditions. . . . Accordingly, the fundamental law must be 
considered ‘work in progress’ legislation, and may expressly provide that it is subject to 
periodic re-evaluation, at least during the first decade of the transition.”). 
 188. Four expungement-related bills were introduced to the General Assembly during the 
2015 session: as of mid-March, two of those bills were proceeding through committee and will 
likely merge into a uniform set of amendments to the expungement law later this spring. 
Compare S.B. 287, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015), with H.B. 1302, 119th Gen 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015). Both bills would expand section 1 coverage to charges 
without arrest and allegations of juvenile delinquency while broadening the mandatory 
redaction of related judicial records. Both bills would also eliminate the requirement that 
petitioners submit a certified driving record along with their petitions. The senate bill would 
remove the filing fee altogether, while the house bill would require civil filing fees—with a 
caveat that courts may reduce or waive the fees for indigent petitioners. The house bill would 
eliminate the requirement that petitioners must have satisfied all fines, fees, costs, and 
restitution obligations, while the senate bill would retain that requirement. The house bill 
would withhold all expungement relief from persons who were convicted of two or more 
felony offenses involving the use of a deadly weapon where such offenses were not committed 
during a single crime. The house bill would also provide that prosecutors need not notify victims 
of their rights—per section 8—in cases of mandatory expungement, while both bills would treat 
a prosecutor’s failure to timely reply to an expungement petition as a waiver of any objections. 
Both bills would add a new section 8.5 with guidance for petitioners who were convicted of 
offenses punishable by indeterminate sentences. Finally, both bills would clarify that an 
expungement case becomes confidential once the court issues an expungement order; however, 
the house bill further clarifies that hearings conducted prior to that order are open to the public. 
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General Assembly’s consideration. These recommendations fall into three general 
categories—administrability, fairness, and effectiveness. 
A. Administrability 
Like courts across the nation, Indiana courts place a premium on judicial 
efficiency.189 Overall, the expungement law is reasonably administrable: it provides 
for explicit waiting periods,190 it enumerates the elements of a proper petition,191 and 
it outlines remedies available in cases involving unlawful discrimination.192 Yet two 
provisions of section 9 interfere with the efficient administration of the statute. 
Subsection (c) provides that the prosecuting attorney may object to the petition, in 
which case the court must set the matter for a hearing “not sooner than sixty (60) 
days after service of the petition on the prosecuting attorney.”193 Subsection (d) 
invites victims of the underlying offense to submit oral or written statements in 
response to the petition for expungement at the time of any such hearing.194 These 
prosecutor/victim input provisions may offer some utility in higher-grade 
expungement proceedings, where courts must exercise discretion to grant or deny 
relief,195 but they simply do not comport with the language in sections 2 and 3. A 
petitioner seeking expungement of a misdemeanor or Class D / Level 6 felony must 
satisfy the waiting period and certain other requirements, but she requires the 
blessing of neither the prosecutor nor the victim. If she satisfies the enumerated 
requirements, the court shall grant her petition. On what basis, other than perhaps 
procedural deficiency, can the prosecutor object?196 And what value can accrue from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 189. See, e.g., Randolph Cnty. v. Chamness, 879 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 2008) (“Reliable 
preferred venue rules increase judicial efficiency because a judge can focus on the merits of a 
dispute rather than its relocation to a more convenient forum.”); Avery v. State, 484 N.E.2d 
575, 576 (Ind. 1985) (“[W]hen both the State and the appellant have asked the trial judge to 
certify the question and the trial judge has so certified on the basis that much time, effort and 
money will be saved by obtaining the interlocutory ruling and where the issue is a single issue 
which in reality needs no separate assignment of errors, it is in the interest of judicial efficiency 
to grant the joint motion and proceed with the decision of the interlocutory appeal on the 
merits.”); Ross v. Bachkurinskiy, 770 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“The trial court 
must balance the need for an efficient judicial system with the judicial preference for deciding 
disputes on the merits.”). 
 190. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-9-2(b), (d)(4) (Supp. 2014). 
 191. See § 35-38-9-8 (Supp. 2014). 
 192. But see infra Part VI.C (proposing supplemental or alternative remedies to increase 
the statute’s effectiveness). 
 193. § 35-38-9-9(c) (Supp. 2014). 
 194. § 35-38-9-9(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 195. But see supra notes 174–179 (questioning whether victims should participate in the 
expungement process at all). 
 196. Even procedural deficiency seems unlikely to justify a full-fledged hearing: a court 
should be able to determine with relative ease whether the ex-offender’s verified petition 
complies with the enumerated requirements of section 8. Perhaps the drafters were concerned 
that petitioners may conceal more recent offenses in their effort to expunge older ones. Yet 
such dishonesty seems improbable given that false affirmations in verified pleadings subject 
the petitioner to the penalties for perjury. See IND. R. TRIAL P. 11(B). Furthermore, if the 
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welcoming the victim’s input if expungement is a foregone conclusion? 197  To 
prevent a slew of unnecessary hearings198 and to avoid mixed messages, the General 
Assembly should amend section 9 so that the prosecutorial objection and victims’ 
input provisions apply—if at all199—to discretionary expungement only. 
The General Assembly could also improve the statute’s administrability by 
drafting guideposts to assist courts with discretionary expungement determinations. 
Currently, the statute provides that a court “may order” expungement for petitioners 
who satisfy the waiting period and other qualifications—yet it attaches no criteria to 
that “may order.” 200  The Assembly could ensure more consistent and efficient 
decision making by articulating factors that courts should consider. The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania enumerated a list of such factors to reinforce its own 
expungement doctrine: 
These (factors) include the strength of the [state’s] case against the 
petitioner, the reasons the [state] gives for wishing to retain the records, 
the petitioner’s age, criminal record, and employment history, the length 
of time that has elapsed between the arrest and the petition to expunge, 
                                                                                                                 
 
General Assembly wishes to include an additional safeguard, it could simply require 
petitioners to obtain and submit a fingerprint background check as part of the expungement 
process. See Inkless: Indiana’s Electronic Fingerprinting Network, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov
/isp/2674.htm. A background check requirement would be faster and more efficient for the 
petitioner and the court, and it would enable low-income petitioners to proceed pro se rather than 
seeking counsel for an unnecessary hearing. 
 197. If anything, such an invitation seems likely to stir up resent among victims, particularly 
if they are unfamiliar with the statute and take the time to draft a thoughtful statement. Inviting 
victims to opine on a process they cannot technically influence hardly seems compatible with the 
constitutional mandate that victims “have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect 
throughout the criminal justice process.” IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b). 
 198. For every one person convicted of a felony, ten are convicted of misdemeanors—
subject to mandatory expungement in Indiana. See Alexandra Natapoff, Why Misdemeanors 
Aren’t So Minor, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2012, 11:33 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and
_politics/jurisprudence/2012/04/misdemeanors_can_have_major_consequences_for_the_peo
ple_charged_.html. 
 199. If the General Assembly insists on victim participation with respect to higher-grade 
expungements, then the Assembly should consider an additional modification to section 8. As 
written, the statute requires prosecuting attorneys to “inform the victim of the victim’s rights 
. . . by contacting the victim at the victim’s last known address.” § 35-38-9-8(e) (Supp. 2014). 
However, it may be impractical to contact victims of stale offenses that predated computerized 
records or to notify all parties in cases involving multiple victims. See supra note 157 and 
accompanying text. The General Assembly could account for such impracticability by drafting 
more flexibly: “If time and circumstances permit, the prosecuting attorney shall inform the 
victim of the victim’s rights if records of the victim’s last known address are reasonably 
accessible or the prosecuting attorney otherwise has a reasonable ability to contact the victim.” 
At a minimum, the Assembly should add language to prevent unnecessary holdups. 
Kentucky’s expungement statute, which similarly requires notice to victims, provides a helpful 
model: “Inability to locate the victim shall not delay the proceedings in the case or preclude 
the holding of a hearing or the issuance of an order of expungement.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 431.078(3) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 200. See § 35-38-9-4(e), -5(e) (Supp. 2014). 
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and the specific adverse consequences the petitioner may endure should 
expunction be denied.201 
Finally, the General Assembly could make the statute more administrable by 
providing an alternative to prosecutorial consent for section 5 felony expungement. 
For such petitions, the Assembly reserved the most stringent prerequisites: a 
petitioner must wait for the later of ten years after her date of conviction or five years 
after completing her sentence, and she must obtain written consent from the 
prosecutor.202 While strict requirements may seem appropriate for expungement of 
serious offenses, several Indiana prosecutors have sharply criticized the statute, and 
it is unclear whether they would consent to expungement even if the petitioner 
exhibits indicia of reform.203 This uncertainty raises concerns of unbalanced justice: 
petitioners in progressive counties may find local prosecutors amenable to a second 
chance, while persons convicted of identical crimes in hardline counties may face 
strong resistance. To avoid this imbalance, the Assembly could authorize courts to 
consider the input of family members, employers, and religious or community leaders 
in lieu of prosecutorial consent.204 Such input might actually shed better light on the 
petitioner’s particular circumstances versus a stamp of approval from the prosecutor, 
who may have limited or no contact with the ex-offender after she reenters society. 
B. Fairness 
Aside from the practical considerations addressed in Part VI.A, the expungement 
statute raises five normative concerns205: (1) it excludes from coverage the records 
of children adjudicated as delinquent; (2) it limits relief and imposes an arbitrary 
delay for persons arrested but not convicted; (3) it bases its waiting periods on 
procedural circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control; (4) it sets an unreasonably 
high bar for low-income petitioners burdened by court costs and restitution 
obligations; and (5) it fails to grapple with the complex nature of rehabilitation 
through its draconian “one-bite-at-the-apple” provision. 
First, the General Assembly should amend the expungement statute to reach 
adjudications of juvenile delinquency. Under current law, confidential police records 
pertaining to delinquent children may be disclosed to a variety of officials and other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Iacino, 411 A.2d 754, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)). 
 202. § 35-38-9-5(c), (e)(5) (Supp. 2014). 
 203. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (Shelby County Prosecutor Kent Apsley); 
supra note 161 and accompanying text (Morgan County Prosecutor Steve Sonnega). 
 204. The Assembly could modify section 5(e)(5) to read as follows: “the prosecuting 
attorney has consented in writing to the expungement of the person’s criminal records, or the 
person has submitted adequate third-party testimony demonstrating that expungement would 
best serve the interests of justice and equity.” The definition of “adequate” testimony could be 
left to the discretion of the courts, or the Assembly could include a definitional provision 
exemplifying presumptively adequate testimony. 
 205. Undoubtedly, critics may argue that the real normative concerns lie with expungement 
itself—that the public has a right of access to criminal records and that rap-sheet stigma is 
simply a consequence of law breaking. See supra Part II for an in-depth discussion of 
expungement’s normative implications. 
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parties, including “researchers”206 and “interested persons.”207 Similar provisions 
allow for the release of otherwise confidential court records,208 and such records may 
be released without a court order to the public upon the filing of a petition alleging 
juvenile delinquency.209 Moreover, “[r]ecords relating to the detention of any child 
in a secure facility shall be open to public inspection.”210 The juvenile expungement 
provisions of title 31 offer some protection, but these provisions are entirely 
discretionary. The juvenile court may grant or deny a petition based on its evaluation 
of, inter alia, the “best interests of the child” and the “person’s current status.”211 
These ambiguous standards, coupled with the ease with which “interested persons” 
may obtain access to (and subsequently publicize) the records, create a substantial 
risk that the errors of youth may follow reformed offenders into adulthood.212 
Unfortunately, the new expungement statute offers little added protection—by its 
terms, it does not reach final adjudications of juvenile delinquency.213 Section 1 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. Upon requesting such records, a researcher must provide information about, inter alia, 
the purpose of his project and the safeguards he will employ to protect the identity of his 
subject. § 31-39-4-9 (2008). 
 207. This broad provision authorizes disclosure to any person having a “legitimate interest 
in the work of the agency or in a particular case,” and it instructs the agency head to consider 
that public safety is generally served if the public is informed about felonious acts or patterns 
of less serious offenses. § 31-39-4-8(a) (2008). Public safety is an important goal, but so is 
privacy—and it is difficult to grasp how this lenient statute affords any real protection to 
former juvenile offenders, particularly since a “person having access to [these records] is not 
bound by [confidentiality requirements] and may disclose the contents of the records.” 
§ 31-39-4-8(b) (2008). 
 208. See §§ 31-39-2-10, -11 (2008). 
 209. The bar for such a petition is quite low: the court will release records if, for instance, 
a petitioner alleges that a child age twelve or older has committed two acts that would be 
misdemeanors if committed by adults. § 31-39-2-8 (2008). 
 210. § 31-39-3-3 (2008). 
 211. § 31-39-8-3 (2008). Even if a petitioner persuades the court to grant expungement, 
the method employed under the juvenile records statute is troubling: the records may be 
“destroyed or given to the person to whom the records pertain.” § 31-39-8-6 (2008). The latter 
approach may give ex-offenders a “false sense of security, leading [them] to believe that no 
trace of the record exists when, in fact, the records may continue to be available.” Carlton J. 
Snow, Expungement and Employment Law: The Conflict Between an Employer’s Need to 
Know About Juvenile Misdeeds and an Employee’s Need to Keep Them Secret, 41 WASH. U. 
J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 24 (1992). 
 212. Concerns that youthful indiscretions may have a prolonged detrimental impact on 
maturing adults have motivated lawmakers in other jurisdictions to pass “second chance” laws 
targeted specifically at this vulnerable group. Such laws extend beyond criminal records. For 
instance, California recently passed an “eraser button” statute that requires social media sites 
with juvenile users to maintain a content deletion feature so that children can “remove 
information that they posted and shouldn’t have.” James Steyer, Oops! Button Lets Kids 
Remove Posts They Regret, CNN (Sept. 26, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013
/09/26/opinion/steyer-california-eraser-button-law/. 
 213. See Kaarin M. Lueck, Expunging a Juvenile Record, IND. JUV. JUST. BLOG (Aug. 8, 
2013, 6:25 AM), http://indianajuvenilejustice.com/2013/08/08/expunging-a-juvenile-record/ 
(confirming that juvenile expungement procedures are “different than the law that went into 
effect July 1, 2013, which allows a person to expunge a criminal record under certain 
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provides that juveniles whose arrests did not result in delinquency adjudications or 
whose adjudications were vacated on appeal may benefit from expungement. Section 
2 applies to final convictions—but of adult misdemeanors only.214 At a minimum, 
the Assembly should amend the statute to extend equal expungement opportunities 
for juvenile adjudications and comparable adult offenses.215 Better yet, the Assembly 
should extend extra lenity to persons who acted out of impulse during the period 
“between the idiocy of infancy and the folly of youth.”216 One attractive option might 
be an automatic expungement scheme for lower-grade juvenile offenses, whereby 
arrest and conviction records are systematically sealed after reformed ex-offenders 
come of age.217 Another possibility might be a social media tool or web app that 
walks users through the expungement process. Illinois has such a resource, 
spearheaded by the Mikva Juvenile Justice Council.218 
Second, the General Assembly should restore provisions of prior law that 
authorized comprehensive expungement for persons arrested but not convicted. 
Under chapter 5, arrestees who were not charged or whose charges were dropped due 
to mistaken identity, no offense in fact, or lack of probable cause could petition for 
expungement without delay: law enforcement agencies had a brief thirty-day window 
to move in opposition.219 Under the 2011 statute, persons who were arrested and 
charged with multiple offenses could qualify for restricted access to any dropped 
                                                                                                                 
 
circumstances”). 
 214. Curiously, the 2011 “restricted access” statute did provide relief for juveniles. See 
§ 35-38-8-2 (Supp. 2011) (repealed 2013) (“This section applies [to] a person . . . adjudicated 
a delinquent child for committing an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a 
misdemeanor or Class D felony that did not result in injury to a person.”). But while the 2011 
statute was abrogated in its entirety by the 2013 statute, the older juvenile expungement 
provisions remain good law. The absurd result of this bifurcated approach is that a teenage 
girl, X, who is adjudicated delinquent for engaging in disorderly conduct, must pin her hopes 
on the good favor of a judge wielding broad discretion. Conversely, an adult man, Y, is entitled 
to erase the record of such an offense after five years of good behavior. 
 215. Generally speaking, offenses that give rise to adjudications of juvenile delinquency 
would be classified as misdemeanors or Class D felonies if committed by adults, and would 
thus fall within the ambit of mandatory expungement. Children who commit more serious or 
aggravated offenses are often waived into adult criminal court. See §§ 31-30-3-1 to -6 (2008). 
 216. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 36 (Stemmer House Publishers, Inc. 
1978) (1911); see also State v. Guerrero, 120 P.2d 798, 802 (Ariz. 1942) (“The policy of the 
juvenile law is to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the 
graveyard of the forgotten past.”). 
 217. Florida maintains such a scheme: minors not classified as serious or habitual offenders 
qualify for automatic expungement of many crimes five years after they turn nineteen, while 
those classified as serious or habitual offenders qualify five years after turning twenty-one. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0515 (West 2006). Virginia has a similar scheme: the clerk of the 
juvenile court is required to annually destroy the records of most lower-grade delinquency 
adjudications for persons who have reached age nineteen if five years have elapsed since their 
last hearing. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-306(A) (2010). 
 218. See Kaarin Lueck, Expunge.io, IND. JUV. JUST. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://indianajuvenilejustice.com/2014/02/20/expunge-io/ (discussing the app). 
 219. § 35-38-5-1(a), (d) (2008) (repealed 2014); cf. Ind. Metropolitan Police Dep’t v. 
Prout, 10 N.E.3d 560, 563 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing that probable cause and the 
other factors enumerated in chapter 5 are no longer relevant in expungement proceedings). 
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charges.220 And under the 2013 statute, persons arrested but not convicted could 
qualify for the court, the BMV, the Department of Corrections, and the Indiana State 
Police to seal records relating to their arrest.221 
Conversely, under the 2014 amendments—which subsume all of the 
abovementioned provisions—persons arrested but not convicted must (1) wait for 
one year and then (2) seek expungement of arrest records located in “alphabetically 
arranged criminal history information system[s].”222 Section 1 excludes expungement 
of internal law enforcement records, court records, and records pertaining to pretrial 
diversion—a baffling legislative choice given the broader relief of section 6.223 There 
is little value in delaying relief for would-be petitioners who were never convicted 
of the charges they seek to expunge.224 And there is no conceivable justification for 
restricting low-grade expungement while offering ample relief to those convicted of 
serious offenses. 225  In keeping with the general spirit of the new law—more 
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. § 35-38-5-5.5 (Supp. 2011) (repealed 2013). A 2013 case, Lucas v. State, illustrated 
the operation of the 2011 statute. 993 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The petitioner in 
Lucas had been charged with four crimes and one infraction stemming from a single arrest. Id. 
at 1160. The petitioner negotiated these charges down to two misdemeanors; he then sought 
to restrict access to records of the dropped charges. Id. The court of appeals found that the 
petitioner was entitled to relief under the 2011 statute. Id. at 1162; see also Dave Stafford, Old 
Expungement Law Applies to Dropped Charges in Plea Deal, COA Rules, IND. LAW. (Aug. 
27, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/old-expungement-law-applies-to-dropped-
charges-in-plea-deal-coa-rules/PARAMS/article/32246. However, the court also observed 
that section 1 of the new statute—which took effect shortly before the Lucas opinion came 
down—worked a “shift from focus on the disposition of individual charges to whether the 
arrest ultimately resulted in a conviction.” Lucas, 993 N.E.2d at 1162. A close reading of 
section 1 confirms the court’s interpretation: “This section applies only to a person who has 
been arrested if . . . the arrest did not result in a conviction or juvenile adjudication . . . .” 
§ 35-38-9-1(a) (Supp. 2014). In other words, had Lucas filed his petition after July 1, 2013, he 
would not have qualified for relief. 
 221. § 35-38-9-1 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). 
 222. § 35-38-9-1(f) (Supp. 2014). 
 223. Compare § 35-38-9-1(f)(2) (Supp. 2014) (requiring no “change or alteration” in the 
records of any court in which charges were filed), with § 35-38-9-6(b) (Supp. 2014) (providing 
that convicted petitioners may qualify for mandatory expungement of court records). Because 
court records and records pertaining to pretrial diversion are published on such databases as 
MyCase.In.Gov and Doxpop.com, as a practical matter, the lowest-level offenders may never 
secure comprehensive relief under the new statute. 
 224. This is particularly so in cases of mistaken identity—which continue to plague the 
criminal justice system in spite of advances in investigative technologies. See, e.g., Leah Hope, 
Chesterton Man Wrongfully Accused of Selling Heroin, ABC7CHICAGO.COM (June 4, 2014), 
http://abc7chicago.com/news/chesterton-man-wrongfully-accused-of-selling-heroin/93838/ 
(Northwest Indiana man spent ten days in jail and lost job after informant improperly identified 
him in drug sting); Steve Jefferson, Attempted Murder Suspect Released After Mistaken Identity, 
WTHR.COM (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:17 AM), http://www.wthr.com/story/24208836/2013/12/12
/assault-suspect-released-after-mistaken-identity-arrest (Indianapolis man spent holidays in jail 
and lost possible job opportunity after victim improperly identified him as attacker). 
 225. The Board of Judges for the Monroe Circuit Court recognized the problem, writing in 
a May 30, 2014, memorandum that while the Board had granted comprehensive relief to 
qualifying petitioners under the previous version of chapter 9—expunging “all records of the 
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forgiveness and opportunity, fewer hurdles—the waiting period and the arbitrary 
limitations of section 1 should be eliminated.226 
Third, the General Assembly should consider starting the “clock” for the statutory 
waiting periods at the date of arrest rather than the dates of conviction or sentence 
completion. Such an adjustment would ensure equitable treatment for petitioners 
whose trials are delayed due to no fault of their own. As in many states, delays are 
endemic in Indiana’s clogged dockets.227 Starting the clock at the date of arrest would 
make the process more consistent and fair.228 
Fourth, the General Assembly should evaluate the efficacy of an expungement 
process that requires full payment of all fines, fees, and court costs and satisfaction 
of any restitution obligations.229 As discussed in Part I above, rap-sheet stigma has a 
ruinous impact on the ability of ex-offenders to secure gainful employment and 
achieve financial stability. Those fortunate reentrants who do find jobs have 
drastically reduced earning power compared with their peers,230 and because certain 
                                                                                                                 
 
case, both locally and in state departments and repositories”—the Board could no longer 
adhere to that practice given the changes in the law. HON. KENNETH G. TODD, BD. OF JUDGES, 
MONROE CIRCUIT COURT, 2014 EXPUNGEMENT LAW 1 (2014). Instead, the Board concluded 
that relief is now limited to petitioners who were actually arrested (versus those who were 
cited or summoned into court) and may extend only to arrest records. Id. at 2. “[T]he amended 
law now denies expungement relief to those who would rationally seem most deserving of 
such a remedy.” Id. The Board predicted a “significant decrease in the volume of Section 1 
petitioners in light of the more limited provisions of relief.” Id. at 3. 
 226. As amended in 2014, section 1 does allow for prosecutors to consent in writing to an 
earlier petition. § 35-38-9-1(b). But rather than leaving the matter to the discretion of the adverse 
party (the state), the Assembly should simply revise section 1 to authorize immediate relief where 
charges are dropped, a defendant is found not guilty, or a conviction is overturned on appeal. 
 227. See In re Brown, 4 N.E.3d 619 (Ind. 2014) (per curiam) (removing superior court 
judge from office after finding that her misconduct resulted in, inter alia, delays in processing 
of pleadings and cases, delays in rulings, a five-month delay on a motion to dismiss, an 
eleven-month delay on a motion to suppress, and ten delayed jail releases); Martin v. State, 
984 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (reversing drunk driving conviction after unreasonable 
182-day delay chargeable to the state); Indiana Man’s Triple-Murder Trial Begins After 
Delays, WTHR.COM, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.wthr.com/story/20528674/indiana-mans
-triple-murder-trial-begins-after-delays (murder trial commenced following five years of 
delays). Unlike courts in most jurisdictions, Indiana courts do not permit so-called “Alford 
pleas” of no contest; consequently, plea bargaining is less efficient in this state. See Carter v. 
State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 128–29 (Ind. 2000) (“A valid guilty plea is a confession of guilt made 
directly to a judicial officer and necessarily admits the incriminating facts alleged. A defendant 
who says he did the crime and says he did not do the crime has in effect said nothing, at least 
nothing to warrant a judge in entering a conviction.” (citation omitted)). 
 228. Such an adjustment need not undermine legislative intent: if the Assembly fears that 
petitioners would qualify too soon, it can simply increase each waiting period accordingly 
(e.g., nine years from the date of arrest rather than eight years from the date of conviction for 
Class D / Level 6 felonies). 
 229. E.g., § 35-38-9-2(d)(3) (Supp. 2014). 
 230. A 2010 study by the Center for Economic and Policy Research found that in 2008, 
36.6 percent of the male prison population had achieved less than a high school education. 
JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, 
EX-OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET 6 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net
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classes of ex-offenders are excluded from government welfare programs, they have 
lower spending power as well.231 With high unemployment prospects and an almost 
comically inadequate minimum wage of $7.25, 232  it may prove impossible for 
ex-offenders to repay the costs they incurred through their participation in the justice 
system.233 The problem is exacerbated by a disconcerting trend in jurisdictions across 
the nation whereby criminal defendants are facing unprecedented fines and fees. A 
2014 exposé by National Public Radio, Guilty and Charged, found that “the costs of 
the criminal justice system in the United States are paid increasingly by the 
defendants,” a practice that “causes the poor to face harsher treatment than others 
who commit identical crimes and can afford to pay.”234 In Indiana, where fees have 
increased since 2010, defendants may be required to pay for the costs of, inter alia, 
                                                                                                                 
 
/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf. Only 11.4% had completed any college. 
Id. The study recited employment statistics showing that incarceration reduces ex-offenders’ 
average annual weeks of work by 9.7% for young white men and as much as 15.1% for young 
black men. Id. at 9. Other statistics paint an even bleaker picture, suggesting that incarceration 
may reduce annual weeks of work by between 13% and 23%. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., MARC MAUER & VIRGINIA MCCALMONT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 
LIFETIME OF PUNISHMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE FELONY DRUG BAN ON WELFARE BENEFITS 1 
(2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/cc_A%20Lifetime%20of
%20Punishment.pdf (discussing statute that imposes lifetime ban on SNAP and TANF 
benefits for felony drug offenders unless states opt out). 
 232. Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Minimum Wage Laws in the States, 
DOL.GOV (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#Indiana. 
 233. Hence a “pervasive cycle of arrest, incarceration, and reentry.” Leavitt, supra note 
13, at 1281. 
 234. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 
2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the
-poor. NPR presented a series of anecdotes illustrating the drastic effects of fines and fees: in 
one case, for instance, a homeless and unemployed driver was ticketed $165 for driving a 
“defective vehicle”; the fine ballooned to $306 due to nonpayment, and the driver was arrested 
and jailed the day before he was scheduled to begin working at Taco Bell. Id. Another 
defendant, who was arrested in Augusta, Georgia, for stealing a can of beer, faced electronic 
monitoring and probation management fees of more than $400 per month: since his only 
income derived from his sale of plasma at a blood bank, he fell into arrears and was sent back 
to jail. Id. One in five residents of Philadelphia had unpaid court bills in 2011, with a median 
debt of $4500. Id. By one estimate, between eighty and eighty-five percent of ex-offenders 
leave prison with incarceration-related bills. Id. 
Escalating fines and fees have given rise to a collateral problem—the reemergence of de facto 
debtors’ prisons. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 
667–68 (1983), that states that assess a fine or restitution as punishment for a crime “may not 
thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it,” the Court left open 
the possibility that states may imprison solvent convicts who willfully refuse to pay—and the 
ambiguity surrounding the nature of willfulness has resulted in “sweeping discrepancies across the 
country over how courts make those decisions.” Shapiro, supra. In Benton County, Washington, 
for instance, a quarter of misdemeanor inmates on any given day are in jail because they failed to 
timely pay their court costs. Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent 
Debtors Prisons, NPR (May 21, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629
/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons. 
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electronic monitoring, probation or supervision, public defender services, and “room 
and board” in prison.235 
Although it is not atypical for state laws to require payment of costs and restitution 
as a condition for expungement, some jurisdictions take a more pragmatic 
approach.236 The General Assembly could revise Indiana’s expungement statute to 
leave the question of full payment to the discretion of judges, who are in the better 
position to consider the individual circumstances of each petitioner and to determine 
whether indigence may warrant a degree of flexibility. 
Finally, the Indiana General Assembly should amend the harsh “one-bite-at-the-
apple” provision. Under the 2013 law, this provision was a “poison pill”: it offered 
no relief for pro se petitioners who made excusable errors in their pleadings.237 The 
2014 amendments ensure that a petitioner whose pleadings were denied for 
procedural reasons may seek subsequent relief, and they allow a judge to consider a 
second petition for expungement if the petitioner neglected to include certain 
convictions in his initial petition due to excusable neglect or circumstances beyond 
his control.238 However, the general rule remains that a petitioner “may file a petition 
for expungement only one (1) time during the petitioner’s lifetime.”239 Presumably, the 
legislature was seeking to avoid a revolving door of crime-and-expungement.240 Yet 
the waiting periods built into the statute suggest that career criminals are unlikely to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014
/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees. 
 236. In California, a guilty verdict may be set aside and all accusations dismissed in many 
cases in which “a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of 
probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in any 
other case in which a court, in its discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a 
defendant should be granted [relief] . . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014) 
(emphasis added). Although costs are normally assessed for such a petition, ability to pay these 
costs “shall be determined by the court . . . and shall not be a prerequisite to a person’s 
eligibility . . . .” § 1203.4(d). In Washington, D.C., expungement is available for persons 
convicted of “eligible” misdemeanors after an eight-year waiting period: the statute makes no 
reference to fines or restitution. D.C. CODE § 16-803 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). In New Jersey, 
where expungement is ordinarily available ten years after the payment of a court-ordered fine, 
a court may grant earlier expungement if a petitioner “substantially complied with any 
payment plan ordered . . . or could not do so due to compelling circumstances affecting his 
ability to satisfy the fine.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014). 
 237. Maureen Hayden, Bill Seeks to Ease Indiana’s ‘Second Chance’ Law, GOSHEN NEWS 
(Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.goshennews.com/local/x651203710/Bill-seeks-to-ease-Indianas
-second-chance-law/print. 
 238. IND. CODE § 35-38-9-9(h)–(j) (Supp. 2014). 
 239. § 35-38-9-9(h) (Supp. 2014). 
 240. The General Assembly may also have worried about the added cost of a new civil 
action for ex-convicts. Obviously, expungement consumes judicial resources, and it may tie 
up prosecutorial resources if the state challenges a petition. Some of the other 
recommendations presented in this Note would help to streamline the process: for instance, by 
eliminating prosecutorial consent and victim’s input requirements for mandatory 
expungement, see supra Part VI.A, the Assembly could foreclose the necessity of hearings in 
such cases. Moreover, to the extent that expungement imposes an added cost on courts, that 
cost is mitigated by the added benefit to society when ex-offenders can secure housing and 
employment without the stigma of a criminal record. See supra Part I.A. 
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qualify.241 And while Indiana is not the only state with a one-time expungement policy, 
other jurisdictions are more forgiving.242 The simplest solution would be to eliminate 
the provision and rely on the waiting periods to prevent abuse. As an alternative, the 
Assembly could draft language to require an additional waiting period—perhaps twice 
the ordinary length—for petitioners who previously obtained expungement. 
C. Effectiveness 
1. Remedies 
In its current form, the expungement statute makes bold assertions. It provides 
that persons who suspend, expel, or refuse to employ anyone on the basis of an 
expunged or sealed record commit “unlawful discrimination.”243 It requires employers 
to ask about criminal records only in terms that exclude expunged offenses.244 It also 
provides that persons who engage in discriminatory conduct commit infractions and 
may be held in contempt.245 
These penalties may have a deterrent effect, yet they are insufficient to restore the 
rights of injured parties—and while the statute provides that a target of discrimination 
is entitled to “injunctive relief,”246 such relief seems inadequate. Injunctions do not 
foster collegial work relations; an applicant formerly targeted by a prejudiced manager 
will not be too eager to join her team.247 There is an evidentiary problem as well: given 
                                                                                                                 
 
 241. For example, a person convicted of a nonviolent Class C felony must generally wait 
eight years from the completion of her sentence, and she must maintain a clean record 
throughout those eight years. § 35-38-9-4(c), (e)(5) (Supp. 2014). Career criminals are 
unlikely to satisfy this lengthy waiting period: they may never qualify for a single 
expungement, let alone a series of expungements. But consider a Hoosier who commits a 
minor indiscretion in his early twenties—such as vandalism or visiting a common nuisance—
and subsequently obtains expungement. If, in his forties, the Hoosier is charged with a DUI, 
he will be precluded from expunging this offense even though he has lived an otherwise decent 
life and even though there is no link between this offense and his earlier indiscretion. 
Arguably, the “one-bite-at-the-apple” provision serves only to dissuade young people from 
wiping the slate clean early in life—out of fear that they may run askance of the law decades 
later. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:9(A)(5)(a) (Supp. 2014) (specifying that 
expungement of a violation or misdemeanor offense other than OWI “shall occur only once 
with respect to any person during a five-year period”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105(4)–(6) 
(LexisNexis 2012) (establishing a criminal history grid to determine whether a petitioner may 
qualify for subsequent expungement). 
 243. § 35-38-9-10(b) (Supp. 2014). 
 244. § 35-38-9-10(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 245. § 35-38-9-10(f) (Supp. 2014). 
 246. See id. 
 247. On an analogous note, retaliation against workplace whistleblowers rose from twelve 
percent in 2007 to twenty-two percent in 2011. Janice Harper, Hear the Lonesome Whistle Blow: 
Workplace Retaliation, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/janice-harper/whisteblower-employers_b_1191737.html. Such retaliation is difficult to prove, 
but it is deeply felt and may include such conduct as “receiving the cold-shoulder from 
co-workers, being verbally abused by supervisors, and being relocated or demoted.” Id. 
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stubborn jobless rates,248 employers are reviewing many applications and may reject a 
candidate for any number of reasons. The candidate may suspect she has been targeted, 
yet her suspicions alone will gain little traction in court. 
Simple revisions to section 10 would render the statute more enforceable and thus 
more effective. First, violations of subsection (d)—the requirement that employers 
ask about criminal records only in terms that exclude expunged offenses—should 
create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination under subsection (f).249 Then, if an 
employer were to violate subsection (d), she would bear the burden to prove that her 
violation was inadvertent or otherwise nondiscriminatory. This burden shift would 
have a likely trickle-down effect: eager to avoid litigation, employers would exercise 
greater care in evaluating and interviewing applicants. 
Second, the General Assembly should amend subsection (f) to provide that victims 
of discrimination are entitled to injunctive relief or, in the alternative, money 
damages.250 A damages remedy would extend relief for persons who seek to vindicate 
their rights but who no longer desire to work for prejudiced employers. Compensatory 
damages might include job search expenses as well as court costs and legal fees. 
Punitive damages would be appropriate if the discrimination was malicious or if 
compensatory damages seemed unlikely to deter future discrimination.251 
Third, the General Assembly should consider amending the civil rights 
enforcement statute to cover discrimination on the basis of an expunged record.252 
Such an amendment would bring rap-sheet discrimination within the jurisdiction of 
the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, a body charged with investigating 
discriminatory practices, taking action against employers who engage in such 
practices, and restoring to the extent feasible the losses incurred by victims.253 
                                                                                                                 
 
 248. Indiana’s unemployment rate in January 2015 reached six percent, an eleven-month 
high—although as Department of Workforce Development Commissioner Steven Braun 
noted, the higher numbers may indicate that more Hoosiers are reentering the workforce and 
seeking employment. Brandon Smith, Indiana Unemployment Rises to Highest Level in 11 
Months, IND. PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 17, 2015), http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/indiana
-unemployment-rises-highest-level-11-months-79493/. 
 249. Indiana’s Rules of Evidence stipulate that “the party against whom a presumption is 
directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption.” IND. R. EVID. 301. 
The remedy this Note is proposing is similar to the burden shift that occurs when a litigant 
makes out a prima facie case of discrimination in the Title VII context. See Filter Specialists, 
Inc. v. Brooks, 906 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 2009). 
 250. A damages remedy was actually proposed in one of the bills introduced but not 
enacted in the 117th General Assembly. See S.B. 407, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Ind. 2011). 
 251. See Stroud v. Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 447 (Ind. 2003) (finding that “punitive damages 
are intended both to deter others and to punish the wrongdoer”). In Indiana, punitive damages 
must not exceed the greater of treble damages or $50,000, IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (2008), and 
must be apportioned between the injured party (twenty-five percent) and the state’s violent 
crime victims compensation fund (seventy-five percent), § 34-51-3-6 (2008). 
 252. The statute presently defines discriminatory conduct as an exclusion from equal 
opportunity on the basis of “race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry.” 
§ 22-9-1-3(l)(1) (2007). 
 253. § 22-9-1-6(d), (j) (2007). 
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Finally, the General Assembly should consider earmarking the funds generated 
from Class C infractions under subsection (f) for initiatives to combat discrimination 
and to promote the rights of the reformed. Presently, these fines—up to $500 per 
violation254—are simply deposited into the state’s general fund.255 This is a missed 
opportunity.256 Fines could instead be deposited into a slush fund to cover the cost of 
educational campaigns, public awareness broadcasts, training sessions for attorneys, or 
reentry/antirecidivism programs aimed at helping ex-offenders make the most out of 
their “second chance.” Funds could also be reserved to offset the cost of indigency 
waivers available as of 2014 under section 33-37-3-2, or they could be deposited into 
a dedicated account to provide free or subsidized counsel for low-income petitioners.257 
2. Reach 
Expungement is only meaningful if it actually relieves the ex-offender of 
rap-sheet stigma. For expungement of most felonies, records remain public but are 
marked to identify their status.258 Yet at this early stage, it is unclear to what extent, 
if any, petitioners benefit from records “clearly and visibly marked or identified as 
being expunged.” 259  Theoretically, this compromise serves the delicate dual 
purposes of (1) maintaining public safety while (2) extending relief to qualified 
petitioners who appear to have rehabilitated. But will employers and others in receipt 
of such records actually treat the ex-offender “as if the person had never been 
convicted of the offense?”260 Rap-sheet stigma is powerful.261 Even if an employer 
knows the law and recognizes that she may not discriminate on the basis of an 
expunged record, she may be subconsciously wary of an ex-offender. If many 
employers behave in kind, the statute’s primary purpose will be thwarted. The 
General Assembly could explore this problem by commissioning an interim study 
committee: such a committee could conduct surveys, contact human resource 
                                                                                                                 
 
 254. § 34-28-5-4(c) (2008). 
 255. § 34-28-5-5(c) (2008). 
 256. While general fundraising is an important governmental activity, Indiana’s budgetary 
situation is enviably stable: the state ended its 2013 fiscal year with a $1.94 billion cash reserve, and 
the General Assembly revoked certain “add-backs” that previously required Hoosiers to increase 
their state taxable income (thereby paying more income tax). See Eric Bradner, Indiana Wraps Up 
2013 Fiscal Year with $1.94B Surplus, THEINDYCHANNEL.COM (July 11, 2013, 10:37 PM), 
http://www.theindychannel.com/news/politics/indiana-wraps-up-2013-fiscal-year-with-194b
-surplus; Indiana Add-Backs, IND. DEP’T REVENUE, http://www.in.gov/dor/4853.htm. 
 257. These recommendations are not too farfetched: in fact, there is precedent for 
earmarking infraction fines under specific circumstances. See § 9-21-5-11(e) (2010) 
(allocating funds from the violation of worksite speed limits to cover the costs of hiring 
off-duty patrol officers); § 34-28-5-5(e) (2010) (allocating funds from traffic infractions in 
Marion County for compensation of county commissioners and for funding the county’s 
guardian ad litem program). 
 258. § 35-38-9-7(b) (Supp. 2014). 
 259. Id. 
 260. § 35-38-9-10(e) (Supp. 2014); cf. Graham Polando, Are Indiana’s Newly Expunged 
Convictions Still Available for Impeachment?, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 30 (2014) (exploring whether 
expunged convictions could be used in impeachment proceedings). 
 261. See supra Part I. 
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professionals, and poll courts to gather data on (1) which petitioners have sought 
expungement, (2) whether they have qualified, and (3) how their circumstances have 
changed subsequent to their petitions.262 
The General Assembly should also explore mechanisms to combat the private 
publication of expunged records. In a 2008 special concurrence, Judge Gordon 
Shumaker of the Minnesota Court of Appeals wrote that to offer “eligible persons 
the remedy of record expungement but then to limit the reach of that expungement 
so that the record remains accessible to the public is to effectively deny that remedy. 
This contradiction surely violates the principle of fundamental fairness on which our 
laws are premised.”263 Shelby County Prosecutor Kent Apsley echoed these concerns 
in an August 2013 interview: “Once a person has been charged, convicted and that 
information hits the World Wide Web, there is no way to cover up those facts.”264 
Granted, no effort to preserve privacy will be absolutely effective, but one need 
not resort to such defeatism. Indeed, the 2014 amendments introduced an important 
change: the contents of a petition for expungement and an order granting 
expungement are now confidential.265 But as Jeffrey Weise at the Division of State 
Court Administration pointed out, the amendment does not make the entire civil case 
                                                                                                                 
 
 262. The added cost and administrative burden of convening interim study committees 
must, of course, be taken into account. See § 2-5-1.2-11 (Supp. 2014) (establishing a right to 
compensation for service on committees); § 2-5-1.2-14 (Supp. 2014) (designating funds for 
committee expenses). Even so, each summer and fall, the General Assembly convenes a 
variety of these committees to evaluate important issues in preparation for the next legislative 
session. See, e.g., 2013 Interim Study Committees, IND. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/interim/committee/. During the last recess, committees met to 
discuss, inter alia, child care, driver education, compensation of public officers, and the state 
fair. Id. The impacts of a key criminal records statute seem to warrant at least as much scrutiny 
as these other matters. 
 263. State v. V.A.J., 744 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (Shumaker, J., 
concurring specially), abrogated by State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 2008). 
 264. Gable, supra note 158; cf. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107–08 
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Publication of the names of juvenile 
offenders may seriously impair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and 
handicap the youths’ prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance by the public. This 
exposure brings undue embarrassment to the families of youthful offenders and may cause the 
juvenile to lose employment opportunities . . . . Such publicity also renders nugatory States’ 
expungement laws, for a potential employer or any other person can retrieve the information 
the States seek to ‘bury’ simply by visiting the morgue of the local newspaper.” (citations 
omitted)); Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live To Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 17, 2006, at A1 (“[E]normous commercial databases are fast undoing the societal bargain 
of expungement, one that used to give people who had committed minor crimes a clean slate 
and a fresh start.”). 
 265. § 35-38-9-10(i) (Supp. 2014). In August 2014, Indiana’s public access counselor, Luke 
Britt, opined that expungement petitions are not governed by the state’s Open Door Law. As a 
result, journalists can be lawfully denied access to courtrooms while expungement proceedings 
are underway. See Brian Culp, Public Access Counselor OKs Closed Hearings on Expungement, 
HERALDTIMESONLINE.COM (Aug. 24, 2014, 11:10 PM), http://www.heraldtimesonline.com
/public-access-counselor-oks-closed-hearings-on-expungement/article_8808fd5b-dabe-5cc3
-ad3d-12054ba288d7.html. 
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confidential,266 and it does not affect the status of records previously published on 
the Internet. An addendum to section 6(a)(2) could require the Central Repository to 
notify prior recipients that an expunged record has been withdrawn from the public 
domain. The Assembly could also contemplate liability for publishers who 
knowingly report on an expunged offense without indicating in some way the fact of 
expungement. Obviously, such a rule would require narrow tailoring to avoid a First 
Amendment violation;267 the precise composition of any such rule is beyond the 
scope of this Note.268 
Finally, the General Assembly should consider how it might harness 
expungement to accomplish other legislative priorities. For instance, the Assembly 
should consider an accelerated expungement scheme for petitioners who demonstrate 
an exceptional dedication to volunteerism. The Assembly could add a caveat to the 
waiting periods, allowing judges to override them for such petitioners. Alternatively, 
the Assembly could create a new service-and-mentorship program, enabling 
ex-offenders to earn “credits” toward the waiting periods akin to “early release” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 266. See Oddi, supra note 121. 
 267. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny: they must be “(1) 
necessary to serve a (2) compelling state interest and (3) narrowly drawn.” LaRose v. State, 
820 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Yet strict scrutiny is not “fatal in fact,” and it may 
be possible for the General Assembly to craft legislation in such a narrow manner that it can 
prevent discrimination against reformed ex-offenders—surely an important governmental 
interest and arguably a compelling one—while preserving the First Amendment rights of 
Internet publishers. 
 268. Although this Note does not purport to predict whether such a rule could withstand 
constitutional scrutiny, it is worth noting that courts have long recognized tort liability for 
certain disclosures of private facts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
Moreover, the General Assembly has restricted publication of confidential information in a 
variety of circumstances. E.g., § 5-14-3-4 (2010) (protection of private information held by 
administrative agencies); § 6-1.1-35-9 (2010) (protection of certain financial information in 
the context of property assessments); § 16-39-2-3 (2008) (protection of mental health records). 
While rejecting the argument that publishers must erase content about expunged arrest 
records, Professor Eugene Volokh entertained the notion that publications should be updated 
if charges are dropped. For entities that refuse to update their publications, liability might 
attach on a theory of “libel by omission.” Eugene Volokh, Is It Libel To Say Someone Was 
Arrested When the Arrest Record Has Been Erased?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 8, 2012, 
5:45 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/08/08/is-it-libel-to-say-someone-was-arrested-when
-the-arrest-record-has-been-erased/. Indiana does not generally recognize such a theory, but 
recovery may lie if “what has been omitted has made a material assertion of fact untrue.” Heeb 
v. Smith, 613 N.E.2d 416, 422–23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). One could argue that reporting on an 
offense without noting the fact of expungement is materially deceptive: in fact, concern about 
such deception underlies the updated trade regulations discussed in note 148, supra. 
In a 2010 article, communications expert Clay Calvert offered an interesting (though 
perhaps unrealistic) alternative to legislative resolution of the expungement / First Amendment 
conflict: an ethical standard requiring journalists who report on arrests and convictions to 
report on subsequent expungements and to explain their legal significance. Clay Calvert 
& Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First Amendment and 
Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 123, 143–44 (2010). Calvert’s recommendation would not eliminate 
discrimination, but it might offer a modest safeguard. 
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procedures.269 Not only would a service program encourage prosocial behavior, it 
would also meet an important need270 while expediting relief for persons who seem 
particularly deserving. 
CONCLUSION 
Indiana’s expungement law has transformed during the space of three short years 
from a stingy scheme into a generous one. This transformation is changing lives. In 
December 2013, for instance, a Gary woman learned that her son would qualify for 
expungement under the new statute. “Hallelujah!” she declared. “This shows there’s 
always another chance for a new beginning.”271 
The project is not complete. Important work lies ahead for the General Assembly 
and the courts as they seek to fashion a law that is just and fair. Its contours must be 
shaped; its implications must be evaluated and litigated. This process will take time. 
But if expungement continues to enjoy bipartisan support, and if the legal 
community continues to participate in this endeavor, the Hoosier state may realize 
the vision that Governor Pence declared, becoming “the best place, once you’ve done 
your time, to get a second chance.”272 
                                                                                                                 
 
 269. See, e.g., § 35-50-6-3.3 (2008) (providing credit time for completion of educational 
coursework, vocational training, and substance abuse recovery programming). 
 270. Private organizations have long acknowledged the unique perspective that 
ex-offenders can offer and the compelling manner in which they can connect with urban youth 
and other at-risk groups that may be distrustful of conventional authority figures. See, e.g., 
Patrick Boyle, Ex-Convicts Connect with Kids, YOUTHTODAY (Mar. 1, 2001), 
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2013, 12:44 AM), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/lake/24501799-418/second-chance-law
-offers-a-fresh-start.html. 
 272. Weidenbener, supra note 7. 
